Wanted: Business Divorce Stories

Are you a business owner who’s been through a contentious break-up with your business partners and would like to share your experience with others? Are you a lawyer with a great war story to share about a business divorce case you handled? If so, and if you’re interested in telling your story for my Business Divorce Roundtable podcast, call me at 212-687-1230 or email me at pmahler@farrellfritz.com.


2of3A company has four founding shareholders each of whom is a director-employee. Their agreement provides that the votes of three out of four founders are required to terminate the employment of any founder or to approve a series of other major decisions such as making distributions, issuing or redeeming shares, amending the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, etc.

When one of the founders no longer is employed and thereby automatically loses his seat on the Board, under the same provision the number of votes required to approve termination of another founder or the other enumerated major decisions drops to two out of three.

Sounds simple so far, right?

Now let’s complicate things. Under another provision, any amendment of the agreement requires the approval of the company and of the founders holding at least 75% of the voting shares, which raises the following questions:

  • What happens when only three founders remain, two of them vote to terminate the third, and the remaining two hold less than 75% of the voting shares?
  • Can the business be managed with less than three founders who lack the voting power to amend the agreement to allow the them to make the enumerated major decisions?
  • Is the vote to terminate the third founder invalid absent a concurrent amendment of the agreement authorizing management of the company by only two founders?
  • If so, does that render the two-out-of-three voting authorization meaningless? Continue Reading Then There Were Two: Court Rejects Minority Shareholder’s Claim of Wrongful Termination Under Founders Agreement

Franklin C. McRoberts, counsel in the Uniondale office of Farrell Fritz and a member of the firm’s Business Divorce Group, prepared this article.


abstentionCivil litigation in federal court can be a luxury experience. The quality of the judiciary is superb. Federal judges often give their cases substantial individualized attention. Lawsuits progress relatively quickly. The procedural rules in federal court have been litigated nationwide, so lawyers can easily find case law on almost every procedural nuance. Yet, business divorce cases are almost never litigated in federal court. Why?

The Friedman Decision

In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit all but sealed the courthouse door to business dissolution cases in federal court, at least in the territorial jurisdiction of the Second Circuit, which includes New York. Continue Reading Federal Court No Mecca for Business Divorce Litigants

Therapy1At first glance, you might think the plaintiff minority shareholder in Sardis v Sardis, 2017 NY Slip Op 27163 [Sup Ct Suffolk County May 11, 2017], achieved her derivative lawsuit’s goal when the defendant controlling shareholder, about a month after suit was filed, suddenly reversed course by revoking the corporation’s allegedly wrongful voluntary dissolution that seemingly was the lawsuit’s raison d’être.

You might also think, having apparently forced defendant’s capitulation, the minority shareholder would be entitled to recover her legal fees in the action as authorized by Section 626 (e) of the Business Corporation Law whenever a shareholder derivative action “was successful, in whole or in part, or if anything was received by the plaintiff . . . as a result of the judgment, compromise, or settlement of an action or claim.”

But, as often is the case in shareholder lawsuits, first impressions can be deceptive.

The Sardis case, in which Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson denied the plaintiff’s fee application seeking $650,000, is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, the facts and circumstances leading up to the decision — starting with the settlement of a complex matrimonial divorce in which the ex-spouses continued to co-own interests in a valuable operating company, followed by legal proceedings in Delaware, followed by legal proceedings in New York — tell a fascinating story of a high-stakes, three-dimensional legal chess game.

Second, and more importantly for practitioners, Justice Emerson’s opinion is one of the very few New York state court decisions that takes a probing look at the prevailing “substantial benefit” standard for an award of legal fees under Section 626 (e). Continue Reading Finding No “Therapeutic” Benefit to Corporation, Court Denies Fee Award in Discontinued Shareholder Derivative Action

Food-Fight1A little over three years ago I reported on the first round of a fascinating “food fight” among four siblings, each of whom is a 25% shareholder of a Brooklyn-based, second-generation food distributor known as Jersey Lynne Farms, Inc. (the “Corporation”), and each of whom also is a 25% member of Catarina Realty, LLC (the “LLC”) which leases its sole realty asset to the Corporation.

The occasion back then was the court’s decision in Borriello v Loconte denying a dismissal motion in a derivative suit brought by Dorine Borriello on the LLC’s behalf in which she alleged that her three siblings breached fiduciary duty by leasing its realty to the Corporation at a drastically below-market rent and by imposing on the LLC certain expenses that ought to be borne by the Corporation as tenant.

In 2011 — the same year her siblings entered into the challenged lease — they ousted Dorine as a director, officer, and employee of the Corporation. In 2012 Dorine and her siblings negotiated a Separation Agreement and General Release setting forth terms for payment of compensation and benefits along with non-compete and non-disclosure provisions. The agreement left intact Dorine’s 25% stock interest in the Corporation.

Dorine’s derivative suit filed in 2013 claimed that the 2011 below-market lease rendered the LLC unprofitable while increasing the Corporation’s income used to pay salaries and other benefits to her siblings. The first round went to Dorine when the court ruled that her General Release did not encompass her derivative claim and enjoined her siblings from advancing their legal expenses from LLC funds.

In the end, however, and subject to any appeals Dorine may bring, it appears that the siblings have won the food fight’s final rounds. Continue Reading “Food Fight” Sequel Ends Badly for Ousted Sibling

NY

DelawareThe common perception among practitioners familiar with the business entity laws of New York and Delaware is that Delaware law generally is friendlier to, and more protective of, majority ownership and management interests.

Two recent cases — one from each state — highlight at least one important area where the common perception does not apply: majority rights under the statutory default rules to adopt or amend an LLC operating agreement without the consent of all the members.

The difference between the two states can have critical consequences for both majority and minority members of the many LLCs that, for better or worse, are formed without a written operating agreement.

The New York case is one I previously wrote about on this blog. Last January, in Shapiro v Ettenson, the Appellate Division, First Department, in a case involving a three-member LLC that was formed without a written operating agreement, affirmed a lower court’s decision construing Section 402 (c) (3) of the New York LLC Law (“except as provided in the operating agreement . . . the vote of a majority in interest of the members entitled to vote thereon shall be required to . . . adopt, amend, restate or revoke the articles of organization or operating agreement”) to permit the two-member majority to adopt a written operating agreement almost two years after the LLC was formed and began operating, without the third member’s consent and notwithstanding certain provisions in the agreement that modified the statutory default rules adversely to the third member. Continue Reading Delaware Ruling Highlights Difference With New York Over Amending LLC Agreements

StandingThis article was co-authored by Franklin C. McRobertscounsel in the Uniondale office of Farrell Fritz and a member of the firm’s Business Divorce Group.


The rules of “standing” in business divorce litigation generally require that the plaintiff have an ownership interest in the business entity at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct and, for derivative claims brought on the entity’s behalf, throughout the litigation.

In Lewis v Alcobi, 2017 NY Slip Op 30664(U) [Sup Ct NY County Apr. 6, 2017], Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Anil C. Singh considered whether a parent’s assignment of her young daughter’s membership interest in a limited liability company as security for the other parent’s unpaid debt deprived the daughter of standing to sue, despite the daughter’s claim to have received no consideration for the assignment.

The case provides useful lessons for litigating disputes of this sort and, perhaps more importantly, for transactional attorneys considering the use of LLC membership interests to secure payment obligations. Continue Reading Assignment of LLC Interest Defeats Standing Despite Alleged Lack of Consideration

Buy-SellAt least on paper, shotgun provisions in shareholder and operating agreements provide an elegant and efficient buy-out solution when business owners can’t get along and need a divorce. In a two-owner company, the one who “pulls the trigger” names a price at which he or she either will buy the other’s interest or sell to the other. The other owner has a specified amount of time to decide which. Since the offeror doesn’t know who will be the buyer, in theory there’s a great incentive to name an objectively fair price. The agreement usually also will prescribe payment terms. No need for appraisal. No fuss. No muss.

I’m not aware of any data-based studies on the subject, but I believe experienced lawyers would concur that shotgun clauses, although frequently included in owner agreements, are rarely invoked. Why is that? I can only speculate that owners generally prefer other ways to achieve a breakup without the uncertainty of knowing who will end up with the business. Also, owners are reluctant to be the trigger-puller, that is, there’s a natural preference to be the one with the option to buy or sell at a price named by the other.

Shotguns also can suffer from informational and financial asymmetries between the owners, a problem highlighted in my two-part, online interview of Professors Landeo and Spier some years ago (here and here). As Professor Spier described it: Continue Reading Aim Carefully Before Pulling Trigger on Shotgun Buy-Sell Agreement

litigiousThe U.S. reportedly has the world’s highest number of lawyers per capita (1 for every 300 people) and the 5th highest number of lawsuits per capita (74.5 for every 1,000 people, topped only by Germany, Sweden, Israel, and Austria).

If, as it appears, litigation has become a national pastime in the U.S., then why, when we describe someone as having a “litigious nature,” does that label carry such opprobrium? Is there an unspoken assumption that anyone who brings a multitude of lawsuits must not have meritorious claims, or has ulterior motives to sue? Then again, we recently awarded the presidency to someone who, according to a USA Today analysis, has sued or been sued in 3,500 cases over the last 3 decades.

These observations are spurred by a recent court decision in Pokoik v Norsel Realties, 2017 NY Slip Op 50459(U) [Sup Ct NY County Apr. 12, 2017], in which Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Jeffrey K. Oing cited the plaintiff’s “litigious nature” among the factors supporting dismissal of his derivative lawsuit brought against the fellow members of a real estate partnership, some of whom are relatives of the plaintiff, Leon Pokoik. Granted, it was not cited as the primary factor, but it’s one of those atmospheric factors in a litigation whose impact is hard to measure. Continue Reading Suing on Behalf of People You’re Suing Can Sink a Derivative Lawsuit — Especially If You Have a Litigious Nature

jaime-dalmeidaForensics means different things to different people in different contexts. But what does it mean in the context of valuing equity interests in closely held business entities?

You’ll learn the answer – and a lot more – in the latest episode of the Business Divorce Roundtable podcast in which I interview Jaime d’Almeida, a Managing Director at industry leader Duff & Phelps in its Disputes & Investigations practice.

To hear the interview, click on the link at the bottom of this post.

Jaime’s valuation and forensic credentials include Senior Appraiser of the American Society of Appraisers and Certified Fraud Examiner. Based in Boston, Jaime has over 20 years of experience in economic and valuation analysis and consulting, and has provided both deposition and trial testimony on valuation and damages issues. Jaime also is a contributing author of Litigating the Business Divorce, the recently published, must-have treatise that I wrote about here.

My interview of Jaime covers a lot of interesting ground, including:

  • defining forensic analysis in valuation
  • the goal of forensic analysis in a valuation engagement
  • forensics methodology
  • the lawyer’s role in the forensic process
  • when to engage the analyst
  • the interplay of forensics and the different valuation approaches
  • forensics and valuation date
  • the types of company records typically sought by the forensic analyst

If you enjoy the podcast, and if you haven’t done so already, check out prior episodes of the Business Divorce Roundtable featuring interviews with leading experts in the field of business divorce and valuation. Please also consider subscribing to the podcast on iTunes, SoundCloud, or your other favorite podcatcher.

No U TurnFranklin C. McRoberts, counsel in the Uniondale office of Farrell Fritz and a member of the firm’s Business Divorce Group, prepared this article.


Article 11 of the Business Corporation Law governs dissolution of closely held New York business corporations. Article 11 has existed, more or less in its current form, for decades. Some of its provisions have been heavily litigated, including Sections 1104 and 1104-a governing judicial dissolution for deadlock and oppression, and Section 1118 governing buyout of a minority’s interest in an oppression proceeding. Other provisions have received surprisingly little attention.

In Morizio v Roeder, 2017 NY Slip Op 50248(U) [Sup Ct Albany County Feb. 17, 2017], Albany County Commercial Division Justice Richard M. Platkin addressed one of these latter, relatively-overlooked sections.

Section 1116 of the Business Corporation Law governs the circumstances in which a party who sues for dissolution may later change his or her mind and withdraw the claim for dissolution. The key language of the statute provides that a petitioner who wishes to withdraw his or her claim must “establish” to the court “that the cause for dissolution did not exist or no longer exists.”

What does that mean? Only a few courts have considered the issue, including a decision last year by Justice Timothy Driscoll in the Cardino case. As it turns out, a leading case to consider the legal standard to withdraw a dissolution claim was an earlier decision in the Morizio litigation. Continue Reading Withdraw a Dissolution Claim? Not So Fast