LLC Dissolution and Receivers
New York’s statutory scheme for dissolution of closely held business entities sometimes looks like a crazy quilt. For instance, for reasons that defy all logic, a petition for dissolution of a business corporation based on shareholder oppression triggers an absolute right on the part of the other shareholders to avoid dissolution by purchasing the petitioner’s shares for fair value, but if the petition is based on director or shareholder deadlock, there’s no buyout right. A petition for dissolution of a business corporation requires service upon the state tax commission and publication notice of the order to show cause in advance of the hearing, but no such service or publication is required in a proceeding for judicial dissolution of a limited liability company (LLC).
Here’s another. The statute governing judicial dissolution of LLCs, contained in Section 702 of the LLC Law (LLCL), has no provision for appointment of a temporary receiver to protect the company’s assets pending the dissolution proceeding. In contrast, Section 1113 of the Business Corporation Law (BCL) expressly authorizes a court to appoint a temporary receiver for that purpose in a dissolution proceeding.
The divergence on this point between the BCL and the LLCL is highlighted in a recently decided case called At the Airport, LLC v. Isata, LLC, 15 Misc 3d 1145(A) (Sup Ct Nassau County June 6, 2007). The case was brought by a 20% member of an LLC seeking its dissolution based on income diversion, financial mismanagement, and denial of access to company records. In a decision by Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Leonard B. Austin, the court notes that the only provision of the LLCL authorizing appointment of a receiver or liquidating trustee, found in LLCL Section 703(a), by its terms applies after the company has been dissolved. Said the court, "[petitioner] is putting the cart before the horse since there must first be a finding of the right to judicial dissolution before a receiver can be appointed."
The petitioner in that case was forced to seek appointment of a temporary receiver under the more formidable standards for receivership found in Article 64 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. The court held that he failed to make the requisite clear showing that the company’s property was in imminent danger of being materially injured or destroyed, and therefore denied the application for appointment of a receiver.
The petitioner in the same case fared no better on a subsequent application for reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence (read opinion here). If anything, the court's second ruling makes the point more emphatically, that compared to applications involving corporations under the BCL, the courts have strictly limited authority to appoint a temporary receiver for an LLC prior to an order of dissolution.
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Peter,
Congratulations on setting up this excellent website. I look forward to contributing information and being educated in this dynamic area of the law.
In Van der Lande v. 423-429 W127th St. LLC, New York Supreme Court (where I represent the petitioner), Justice Diamond granted the petition for dissolution and appointed a receiver in the same decision. It is my interpretation that the petition for dissolution is a summary proceeding and can be decided relatively quickly by the petition and answering papers. If an immediate action is required, the petitioner may and should request a TRO pending the decision. This is certainly not as comprehensive as the appointment of a Receiver, but should prevent any further wrongdoing by the defendants.
I agree that the LLCL should be amended to afford the business community in our state the normative jurisprudence accorded to business corporations and partnerships. After Tzolis v. Wolfe, it looks like we're on the right path.
A trial in the above matter is scheduled for March 2008 and the petitioner will be seeking punitive damages from the defendants as a result of their breach of fiduciary duties, since the LLCL does not provide for reimbursement of attorneys fees (which is statutorily based in the BCL but not contained in the common law which was the basis for the court's decision in Tzolis). I will certainly keep you posted.