Decision Lowers the Bar for Former Partner's Claims of Fraudulent Buyout
When non-controlling partner A sells out to controlling partner B, following which B sells the company to a third party at a disproportionately high premium over A's price, A may suspect that B withheld information pertaining to the company's value at the time of A's sale. The question is, does A have a valid claim against B to recover a share of the re-sale profits? Does caveat venditor give way to a fiduciary-based, affirmative obligation on B's part to disclose to A any and all information material to the sale price?
An opinion handed down last week by an appellate court in Manhattan appears to lower the bar for such a lawsuit, and sends a cautionary message to transactional counsel concerning the effectiveness of seller representations and releases in partner buyout agreements.
In Littman v. Magee, 2008 NY Slip Op 05347 (1st Dept June 10, 2008), Steven Littman held an 18.7% membership interest in Rockwood Realty Associates LLC, a real estate investment firm formed in 1996 and managed by another LLC controlled by Rockwood's majority owners. Littman's 28-page complaint essentially alleged that the majority owners engaged in a squeeze-out through property sales that forced Littman to incur large personal tax bills on undistributed K-1 profits, contrary to an alleged "understanding" when the company was formed that distributions sufficient to cover taxes would be made.
Continue Reading...Dissenting Shareholder Loses Right to Receive Dividends Upon Merger Consummation
Like most states, New York's Business Corporation Law (BCL) permits a shareholder to opt out of mergers and certain other corporate restructurings by electing to be cashed out for the "fair value" of his or her shares. The so-called dissenting shareholder statute, BCL Section 623, sets forth procedures and deadlines for submission of the shareholder's written objection to the proposed transaction, for the corporation's making of a price offer, and for the filing of a judicial appraisal proceeding in the event the shareholder rejects the corporation's offer. A statutory appraisal proceeding also may result from a "freeze-out merger" in which the controlling shareholders compel minority shareholders to redeem their shares for cash. The dissenting shareholder statute typically comes into play with merger transactions involving corporations with relatively large capitalization and whose minority shareholders include passive investors. Section 1005 of the New York Limited Liability Company Law likewise permits members to dissent and cash out from mergers or consolidations involving LLC's.
A recent court decision, in a case called McCully v. Jersey Partners, Inc., 18 Misc 3d 1138(A) (Sup Ct NY Co 2008), raises a caution flag for dissenting shareholders and their counsel when it comes to asserting claims for dividends that accrue prior to merger consummation but are not payable until afterward.
Continue Reading...LLC Member's Marital Woes Lead to Loss of Membership Interest
Shareholder agreements for close corporations often include provisions designed to protect the company and its shareholders against involuntary stock transfers or other potentially disruptive court decrees arising from the dissolution of a shareholder's marriage. The same holds true for limited liability company (LLC) operating agreements and their members. Sometimes, as this week's featured case illustrates, such provisions can backfire when a member's marital woes coincide with internal disputes among the LLC's members.
Matter of Madelone (Viscomm Group, LLC), 18 Misc 3d 1131(A) (Sup Ct Albany County 2008), involved an LLC formed in 2003 by three members to engage in advertising and public relations. Initially, the three members -- Whitten, Harrington and Madelone -- each held a one-third interest. Whitten served as manager. Subsequently, a fourth person was brought in as a 10% member, reducing the others to 30% each.
In 2005, when Whitten was experiencing marital difficulties, he proposed certain amendments to the operating agreement which the membership adopted. The amendments required a member who files, or whose spouse files, for legal separation or divorce to sell, and the other members to buy, the membership interest of the member involved in the marital proceedings. The amendments also established a method for computing the purchase price and the payment terms. The following year, Whitten filed for separation from his wife whereupon he relinquished his position as manager and was appointed to a salaried position with the company, only to be reinstated as a member and manager upon reconciling with his wife.
Continue Reading...Appellate Court Enforces Stock Buyback Triggered by Dissolution Petition
One of my pet issues, on which I've written a number of times (see here, here and here), is whether the filing of a dissolution petition triggers a mandatory stock buyback under a shareholders' agreement that provides a right of first refusal (RFR). The cases raising the issue have all been deadlock dissolution petitions brought by 50% shareholders under Business Corporation Law Section 1104(a). That statute, unlike Section 1104-a governing minority shareholder oppression, does not give the respondent shareholders the right to purchase the petitioner's shares under Section 1118.
If the shareholders' agreement expressly provides that the filing of a dissolution petition triggers the RFR, unquestionably it should be enforced. The problem arises with the more typical RFR that does not contain such express language, but instead contains what most would consider boilerplate reference to stock transfers. Is enforcement by reason of such general language consistent with a shareholder's reasonable expectations, and with the statutory right to seek dissolution? The issue has very serious ramifications for the petitioner (and for petitioner's lawyer who may be unwary of the trap) because the RFR typically provides a below-market price for the buyback with a long-term payout.
A 2006 appellate decision in a case called Matter of Johnsen (ACP Distribution, Inc.) ruled that a dissolution petition triggered an RFR containing the operative terms, "donate, hypothecate, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of his Stock in any manner whatsoever." A September 2007 trial court decision in Matter of Schneck (R&J Components Corp.) (previously blogged here) went the other way where the operative terms were "sell, assign, mortgage, hypothecate, transfer, pledge, create a security interest or lien, encumber, give or otherwise dispose of any of the shares."
Continue Reading...Roundup of 2007 Business Divorce Cases
The New York Law Journal recently published, for the 9th consecutive year, my annual review of business divorce cases (read it here). Most of the cases discussed in the article have been mentioned in previous postings.
Here's a rundown of the article's choices for 2007's most interesting business divorce cases, with links provided to the cases and to previous postings:
- Dissolution and Right of First Refusal: Matter of Schneck (R&J Components Corp.) (discussed here) and Matter of Schwimmer (El-Roh Realty Corp.), where two judges reached opposite results on the issue of whether the petitioner's filing of a dissolution petition triggered a right of first refusal and mandatory buyback under the shareholders' agreement.
- LLCs and Temporary Receivers: At the Airport, LLC v. Isata, LLC (discussed here) in which the court held that the LLC Law does not authorize the court to appoint a temporary receiver until after dissolution is ordered.
- Grounds for Dissolution: Matter of Cheung (Ho Foong Shiu Realty Corp.) and Matter of Livolsi (111 Glen Street Corp.) (discussed here) in both of which the courts denied dissolution petitions brought by 50% shareholders claiming oppression by the other shareholder.
- Restrictive Covenants: Matter of Autz (Ronald C. Fagan, M.D. and Arthur Lutz, M.D., P.C.) (discussed here) where the court ruled that the sale in liquidation of the company's good will is a sale "under compulsion" and therefore does not trigger an implied covenant not to solicit customers.
- Pre-Conversion Agreements: Matter of Hochberg (Manhattan Pediatric Dental Group, P.C.) (discussed here) in which the court compelled arbitration of a dissolution case under an arbitration clause in a partnership agreement that pre-dated the conversion of the business to a professional corporation.
- Partner Limited Liability Shield: Ederer v. Gursky (discussed here) where New York's top court interpreted Section 26(b) of the Partnership Law as not shielding partners in limited liability partnerships from personal liability against claims for breach of the partnership's or partners' obligations to each other.
If you'd like to read some of my previously published annual reviews, look under Links on the right sidebar of this blog's home page where you'll find links to my articles covering the years 2003 through 2006.
Next week, New York Business Divorce returns to Anatomy of a Dissolution Slugfest, Part III.
One Case, Three Great Issues
When it comes to reading court decisions in business divorce cases, I have a number of pet issues. If I come across a decision with one such issue, I’m happy. Two in the same opinion, I’m thrilled. Three in the same opinion, it’s like hitting the trifecta.
A recent decision by Nassau County Commercial Division Justice Stephen A. Bucaria offers a winning threesome: (1) arbitrability of corporate dissolution petitions; (2) petitions seeking dissolution of out-of-state corporations; and (3) dissolution petitions that trigger mandatory buybacks under a shareholders’ agreement.
The case, Matter of Schneck (R&J Components Corp.), involves two brothers who went into, and eventually each inherited 50% interests in, an electronic parts business founded by their father who died in 1990. The business came to be organized as six separate companies, two of which were formed as out-of-state corporations but all of which operated in New York. The complaining Brother A claimed that Brother B had frozen him out of the business, denied him access to business records, and took hundreds of thousands of dollars more each year than Brother A was getting. Brother A sought judicial dissolution of all the companies based on internal dissension and deadlock under Business Corporation Law § 1104.
Brother B raised several defenses. First, he asked the court to stay the proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in the shareholders’ agreement. Such clauses routinely are enforced in dissolution proceedings. In this case, however, the court found that Brother B had waived arbitration by moving for summary judgment on the merits. Here’s the money quote: "The courtroom . . . may not be used as a convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall so as to allow a party to create his own unique structure combining litigation and arbitration."
Brother B fared better on his next defense aimed at the two non-New York corporations, successfully arguing that a New York court may not dissolve a foreign corporation even if its principal place of business is New York. The argument invoked the so-called "internal affairs" doctrine under which courts traditionally refuse to rule on the regulation and management of a foreign corporation. I have followed this issue for many years in the hope -- thus far unrealized -- that courts will re-analyze the wisdom of the internal affairs doctrine as applied to the dissolution of a corporation operating wholly within New York whose only connection to the other state is the place of incorporation. After all, New York courts routinely interpret and apply the law of other states in many other types of corporate governance disputes. Although the idea of a New York court ordering, e.g., Delaware's secretary of state to dissolve a Delaware corporation is no less repugnant than that of a Delaware judge ordering New York's secretary of state to dissolve a New York corporation, so long as the court has personal jurisdiction of the business owners it seems to me that either judge in either jurisdiction could order the parties to file a certificate of voluntary dissolution without offending the incorporating state's sovereignty. Also, there is at least one lower court decision (Matter of Dohring [CVC Products, Inc.], 537 NYS2d 767 [1989]) holding that, even if dissolution of a New York based foreign corporation technically is not within the court's power, it may adjudicate the case and fashion a lesser or alternative remedy that achieves "substantial justice" between the parties.
The third issue is one of my all-time favorites, about which a colleague and I wrote an article published in July 2006 in the New York Law Journal. Shareholders’ agreements frequently have stock transfer restrictions that grant a right of first refusal under certain circumstances, generally involving a shareholder who wishes voluntarily to sell his or her shares. Such provisions often include broad language that can be construed as triggering the duty to offer the shares for sale – typically at a formula price well below fair value – whenever there is an attempt to dispose of one's shares through any means, including judicial dissolution. In this case, the court concluded that the language was not broad enough and therefore it denied Brother B’s request to compel Brother A to convey his shares.
Judicial Dissolution and Buyouts
New York has a peculiar statutory scheme when it comes to dissolution proceedings and buyouts.
There are two basic statutes governing dissolution of closely held business corporations. The older statute, codified as Section 1104 of the Business Corporation Law (BCL), permits a 50% shareholder to seek dissolution in cases of deadlock. When one 50% shareholder petitions for judicial dissolution under this statute, the other has no right to elect to purchase the petitioner’s shares. More often than not, if the business has going concern value, the parties eventually will reach a settlement involving a buyout, but the point is, neither party can force a buyout. Essentially it becomes a game of chicken as both sides maneuver in and out of court to gain negotiating leverage as the company approaches the dissolution precipice.
The other, newer statute, BCL Section 1104-a, permits a shareholder holding at least 20% of the voting shares of a closely held corporation to seek judicial dissolution where those in control have engaged in illegal, fraudulent or oppressive conduct or have looted, wasted or diverted corporate assets. Here, unlike deadlock dissolution, the legislature enacted a companion statute, BCL Section 1118, which gives the respondent majority shareholders (that is, the shareholders who did not bring the dissolution petition) the absolute right to avoid dissolution by electing to purchase the petitioner’s shares. If the parties cannot agree on price and terms, the court will determine the “fair value” of the petitioner’s shares.
This distinction between buyout rights based on the different grounds for dissolution is ignored by many (arguably wiser) states whose statutes authorize compelled buyouts in all cases seeking judicial dissolution of closely held corporations.
Future posts will address the interesting tactical decisions faced by 50% shareholders who may have the option to seek judicial dissolution under both BCL Sections 1104 and 1104-a simultaneously. For now, if you’re considering bringing a dissolution petition as an oppressed minority shareholder under Section 1104-a, be aware that the controlling shareholders will have the right to buy you out, but not if you’re a 50% shareholder seeking dissolution based on deadlock under Section 1104.
The Case of the One-Dollar Buyout
Under New York’s statute governing corporate dissolution petitions by oppressed minority shareholders, the remaining shareholders may avoid dissolution by electing to purchase the petitioner’s shares for fair value. (View the buyout statute, Section 1118 of the Business Corporation Law). I recently got a call from someone deciding whether to make the election, asking if it’s possible for a court to assign a zero value to the petitioner’s shares. The practical side of my brain responded, If the business has no value, why are both sides spending legal fees fighting over a corpse?
In law as in life, however, the practical answer does not always carry the day. It is not unusual for one business owner (i.e., the purchaser) to see a sow’s ear where the other owner (i.e., the seller) sees a silk purse. There is nothing in the buyout statute or case precedent that precludes a court from deciding that the petitioner’s shares are worthless. In one recent decision in a valuation proceeding, the court ordered the petitioner to deliver his shares to the purchasing shareholder for a symbolic $1.00 payment. The court credited the opinion of the purchaser’s expert appraiser, who testified that the shares had no positive value based on the company’s debt, its continuing losses and the short remaining term of its lease. The petitioner appears to have sealed his own fate by failing to offer his own appraiser. Worse yet, the court also denied the petitioner’s application to remove his surname from the company’s name. A very painful dollar to accept, indeed.
The case, Matter of Giraud, 2007 NY Slip Op 32473 (U) (Sup Ct NY County Aug. 3, 2007), was decided by Justice Lewis Bart Stone of the New York County Supreme Court.
