Court Invalidates Control-Shifting Stock Transfer Made in Violation of Corporation's Right of First Refusal
The right of first refusal (RFR) is a type of stock transfer restriction found in shareholder agreements of closely held corporations. Under the most common form of RFR, the shareholder seeking to transfer his or her shares to another person is required to submit sequentially to the corporation and, if the corporation declines, to the other shareholders the opportunity to purchase the shares on the same terms as are being offered by the proposed purchaser. The courts routinely enforce RFRs in recognition of the special partnership-like character of close corporations.
A recent decision by the Appellate Division, First Department, in Giaimo v. EGA Associates Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 09277 (1st Dept Dec. 15, 2009), illustrates the mischief that can occur when the RFR is not properly spelled out in a shareholders' agreement but, instead, is set forth in abbreviated and incomplete form on the back of the share certificates. Giaimo also illustrates the paramount importance New York courts place on the fiduciary duties owed by majority shareholders and directors of close corporations to minority shareholders, arguably to the point of preempting the statutory scheme governing director's self-interested transactions.
EGA Associates Inc. (EGA) is a closely held New York corporation formed in 1961 to own and operate real estate. According to the complaint filed by Robert Giaimo (read here), the stock of EGA was held one-third each by Robert and his siblings, Edward and Janet. Edward died after a long illness in March 2007. Edward's will bequeathed his EGA shares in equal parts to Robert and Janet, which would have left them as equal 50% shareholders. Two weeks before his death, however, Edward sold one of his shares to Janet for $80,000, thereby giving her majority ownership upon Edward's death. Some months later, Janet gave notice of meetings of the shareholders and directors at which she obtained voting control of the board by electing herself and her lawyer as two of the three directors.
Continue Reading...Beware Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation When Drafting Shareholder and Operating Agreements
Our English common-law heritage includes what's known as the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation. Law students first encounter the rule in their property class, where they learn about the abolishment of the feudal "fee tail" which restricted the transfer of real property to a specific line of male heirs. Basically, our laws and public policy strongly favor the right of persons to freely dispose of their property both real and personal. Agreements that place ownership of property in the hands of one person and the right to alienate, i.e., sell or otherwise convey the property, in the hands of another, are unenforceable.
The rule is not absolute. It only prohibits unreasonable restraints on alienation. For instance, where a niece agreed to pay $15,000 to her uncle and aunt for a $100,000 farm that was in the family for generations on condition that, during the uncle's and aunt's lifetimes, the niece wouldn't mortgage the farm or convey it to her husband, a court enforced a reversion clause in the recorded deed giving the property back to her relatives when the niece placed mortgages on the farm that subsequently were foreclosed. The court found it reasonable to enforce the restraint to preserve family ownership of the farm for a limited duration. Moreover, the niece's interest in free alienation was outweighed by her agreement to the restraint in consideration for a drastically reduced price. (Example taken from Alby v. Banc One Financial, 128 P3d 81 [Sup. Ct. Wa. 2006].)
What's this got to do with shareholder and operating agreements?
Continue Reading...Fired Minority Shareholder's Oppression Claim Not Barred by At-Will Employment Provisions in Shareholders' Agreement
Some months ago, in a post about the intersection of the at-will employment doctrine and fiduciary duty among shareholders in close corporations, I wrote:
The most common allegation of oppression by minority shareholders involves termination of employment by the controlling shareholders. The Court of Appeals in Matter of Kemp & Beatley noted that obtaining employment is often the main reason for becoming a shareholder in a closely held company that typically pays no shareholder dividends. As I've pointed out before, case law holds that the majority's termination of the minority's at-will employment does not give rise to a wrongful termination remedy under either a contract or tort theory, but it may be oppressive for purposes of seeking judicial dissolution where the shareholder joined the venture with the reasonable expectation of getting and keeping a job.
This principle is vividly on display in a recently decided case called Ambar v. Devington Technologies, Ltd., 2009 NY Slip Op 32373(U) (Sup Ct NY County Oct. 13, 2009), where the court refused to dismiss a petition for involuntary corporate dissolution brought by a minority shareholder whose employment was terminated by the controlling shareholders, notwithstanding at-will employment provisions in their shareholders' agreement.
Continue Reading...Appellate Court Enforces Stock Buyback Triggered by Dissolution Petition
One of my pet issues, on which I've written a number of times (see here, here and here), is whether the filing of a dissolution petition triggers a mandatory stock buyback under a shareholders' agreement that provides a right of first refusal (RFR). The cases raising the issue have all been deadlock dissolution petitions brought by 50% shareholders under Business Corporation Law Section 1104(a). That statute, unlike Section 1104-a governing minority shareholder oppression, does not give the respondent shareholders the right to purchase the petitioner's shares under Section 1118.
If the shareholders' agreement expressly provides that the filing of a dissolution petition triggers the RFR, unquestionably it should be enforced. The problem arises with the more typical RFR that does not contain such express language, but instead contains what most would consider boilerplate reference to stock transfers. Is enforcement by reason of such general language consistent with a shareholder's reasonable expectations, and with the statutory right to seek dissolution? The issue has very serious ramifications for the petitioner (and for petitioner's lawyer who may be unwary of the trap) because the RFR typically provides a below-market price for the buyback with a long-term payout.
A 2006 appellate decision by the First Department in a case called Matter of Johnsen (ACP Distribution, Inc.) ruled that a dissolution petition triggered an RFR containing the operative terms, "donate, hypothecate, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of his Stock in any manner whatsoever." A September 2007 trial court decision in Matter of Schneck (R&J Components Corp.) (previously blogged here) went the other way where the operative terms were "sell, assign, mortgage, hypothecate, transfer, pledge, create a security interest or lien, encumber, give or otherwise dispose of any of the shares."
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