Gun4HireThe title of this post notwithstanding, the judge’s decision in the recent, high-stakes stock valuation case I’m about to describe, featuring a clash of business appraiser titans whose conclusions of value differed by almost 400%, did not refer to them as “hired guns.”

But the judge did not mince her words in expressing the view that, while “unquestionably qualified to testify on the issue of valuation,” the two experts, whose “zealous advocacy” for their respective clients “compromised their reliability,” offered “wildly disparate” values that were “tailored to suit the party who is paying for them.” Ouch!

The 54-page decision by a Minnesota state court judge in Lund v Lund, Decision, Order & Judgment, No. 27-CV-14-20058 [Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Cnty. June 2, 2017], rejected both experts’ values — $80 million according to the expert for the selling shareholder and $21 million according to the expert for the purchasing company — in arriving at the court’s own value of $45 million for a 25% interest in a chain of 26 upscale grocery stores in the Twin Cities area known as Lunds & Byerlys together with affiliated management and real estate holding companies. Continue Reading Appraisers’ Valuations Are Light-Years Apart, But Does That Make Them Hired Guns?

Buy-SellAt least on paper, shotgun provisions in shareholder and operating agreements provide an elegant and efficient buy-out solution when business owners can’t get along and need a divorce. In a two-owner company, the one who “pulls the trigger” names a price at which he or she either will buy the other’s interest or sell to the other. The other owner has a specified amount of time to decide which. Since the offeror doesn’t know who will be the buyer, in theory there’s a great incentive to name an objectively fair price. The agreement usually also will prescribe payment terms. No need for appraisal. No fuss. No muss.

I’m not aware of any data-based studies on the subject, but I believe experienced lawyers would concur that shotgun clauses, although frequently included in owner agreements, are rarely invoked. Why is that? I can only speculate that owners generally prefer other ways to achieve a breakup without the uncertainty of knowing who will end up with the business. Also, owners are reluctant to be the trigger-puller, that is, there’s a natural preference to be the one with the option to buy or sell at a price named by the other.

Shotguns also can suffer from informational and financial asymmetries between the owners, a problem highlighted in my two-part, online interview of Professors Landeo and Spier some years ago (here and here). As Professor Spier described it: Continue Reading Aim Carefully Before Pulling Trigger on Shotgun Buy-Sell Agreement

No U TurnFranklin C. McRoberts, counsel in the Uniondale office of Farrell Fritz and a member of the firm’s Business Divorce Group, prepared this article.


Article 11 of the Business Corporation Law governs dissolution of closely held New York business corporations. Article 11 has existed, more or less in its current form, for decades. Some of its provisions have been heavily litigated, including Sections 1104 and 1104-a governing judicial dissolution for deadlock and oppression, and Section 1118 governing buyout of a minority’s interest in an oppression proceeding. Other provisions have received surprisingly little attention.

In Morizio v Roeder, 2017 NY Slip Op 50248(U) [Sup Ct Albany County Feb. 17, 2017], Albany County Commercial Division Justice Richard M. Platkin addressed one of these latter, relatively-overlooked sections.

Section 1116 of the Business Corporation Law governs the circumstances in which a party who sues for dissolution may later change his or her mind and withdraw the claim for dissolution. The key language of the statute provides that a petitioner who wishes to withdraw his or her claim must “establish” to the court “that the cause for dissolution did not exist or no longer exists.”

What does that mean? Only a few courts have considered the issue, including a decision last year by Justice Timothy Driscoll in the Cardino case. As it turns out, a leading case to consider the legal standard to withdraw a dissolution claim was an earlier decision in the Morizio litigation. Continue Reading Withdraw a Dissolution Claim? Not So Fast

crazyWhenever I contemplate New York’s unusual case law on the discount for lack of marketability (DLOM) in statutory fair value buy-out proceedings, I cast my eyes westward, to the far banks of the Hudson River, and take comfort in the fact it could be worse — I could be in New Jersey.

A “business appraiser’s nightmare” is how Chris Mercer described New Jersey’s “bad behavior discount” in his commentary on the Wisniewski v Walsh case decided a little over a year ago by a New Jersey appellate court, in which it affirmed the trial court’s application of a 25% DLOM seemingly plucked out of thin air, and notwithstanding what the trial court itself admitted were “strong indicators of liquidity,” for the stated purpose of penalizing the selling shareholder for his oppressive behavior toward the other shareholders — behavior that in no way harmed the corporation’s business or affected its marketability!

Now comes another New Jersey trial court decision in another fair value buy-out case, and guess what? The court applied the same 25% DLOM without any discussion of the factors supporting its application or quantification other than the court’s finding that the selling shareholder was guilty of oppressive conduct against the purchasing shareholder.

In Parker v Parker, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2720 [Dec. 22, 2016], two brothers, Richard and Steven Parker, took over from their parents and for the next 25 years operated as 50/50 owners a wholesale flower business and a separately incorporated wholesale plant business which eventually became a garden center. Richard ran the flower business and Steven the garden business as separate fiefdoms with minimal overlap. Continue Reading Has New Jersey Gone Off Its DLOM Rocker?


shutterstock_581026324As promised in the postscript to last week’s post about the appellate ruling in the Gould case, affirming Justice Platkin’s order granting the oppressed minority shareholder’s dissolution petition involving a pair of construction firms, we now arrive at Justice Platkin’s subsequent determination of the fair value of the minority shareholder’s equity stake.

The decision raises several important issues of interest to business appraisers and business divorce counsel, including selection of tax rates, the appropriate look-back period in determining historical earnings, adjustments for non-arm’s length inter-company transactions, and use of the market approach.

Justice Platkin’s valuation ruling last month in Matter of Digeser v Flach [Gould Erectors & Rigging, Inc.], 2017 NY Slip Op 50220(U) [Sup Ct Albany County Jan. 31, 2017], is the culmination of an oppressed minority shareholder dissolution petition filed in April 2013. In his November 2015 post-trial decision, which I wrote about here, Justice Platkin found that Digeser, a minority shareholder in the two corporations, established grounds for dissolution based on oppression, but he left open the question of remedy. Continue Reading Business Appraisers Spar Over Tax Rates, Market Approach and Other Key Issues in Fair Value Buy-Out Case

exitDoes a shareholder have a fiduciary duty not to exercise a contractual right under the shareholders’ agreement to resign and demand a buy-out of his shares by the financially distressed corporation, particularly when the corporation’s default would trigger the other shareholders’ personal guarantees?

That’s the intriguing question posed in an unpublished decision last month by Nassau County Commercial Division Justice Vito M. DeStefano in Mondschein v Badillo, Decision and Order, Index No. 600307/14 [Sup Ct Nassau County Jan. 12, 2017], where a physician resigned from his struggling medical professional corporation amidst ultimately unsuccessful efforts to merge with another practice, and who then brought suit against the P.C., his fellow shareholders, and a related realty company that owned the practice’s medical office, to enforce his buy-out and retirement rights under the various agreements governing the two entities.

The agreements essentially gave senior physician-shareholders the right to retire with an obligatory buy-out by the entities of their equity interests in the practice and the realty, as well as payment of specified retirement benefits. In addition, each shareholder gave a joint-and-several personal guarantee of each other shareholder’s rights to payment. Continue Reading Race to the Exit as Professional Practice Falters

4CThe case I’m about to describe involves an unusual clash of two fundamental principles of corporate governance for closely held corporations:

Principle No. 1:  Stock transfer restrictions may be used to preserve continuity of ownership and management within a family or other control group, without violating the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation of property.

Principle No. 2:  Controllers owe a fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders fairly and evenly when authorizing and issuing new shares, and must have a bona fide business purpose for any departure from precisely uniform treatment.

The clash came to a head in a decision this month by Brooklyn Commercial Division Justice Lawrence Knipel involving 4C Foods, a well-known, fourth generation, family-owned business that manufactures and markets under the 4C® brand grated Italian cheeses, bread crumbs, iced tea, and drink mixes. The suit pits Nathan Celauro, a non-managing, minority owner holding directly or beneficially about 22% of 4C’s voting and non-voting shares, against his cousin John Celauro, the managing majority shareholder who controls or has aligned with him the remaining 78%. (Disclosure: Farrell Fritz represents the minority shareholder in the case.)

The case and Justice Knipel’s decision in Celauro v 4C Foods Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 31917(U) [Sup Ct Kings County Oct. 12, 2016], is the latest in a series of litigations and court rulings between two factions of the Celauro family beginning around 2005, following the death of Nathan’s father the year before. About 20% of the father’s voting and non-voting shares passed to his wife either directly or to trusts under her control, with the remaining 2% going directly to Nathan. Continue Reading Too Clever By Half? Court Permits Suit Challenging Share Increase Tied to Transfer Restrictions

door“Marriage is tough, business relationships may be tougher.”

Wise words from someone who should know — Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Timothy S. Driscoll, who presided over matrimonial cases before joining the Commercial Division where he has adjudicated some of the thorniest business divorce cases such as the AriZona Iced Tea donnybrook.

The quoted words appear in an oral argument transcript in a case called Cardino v Feldman pending before Justice Driscoll involving a fight between 50-50 owners of a construction company operated by the defendant Feldman. It’s a factually and procedurally complex matter, the details of which I’ll spare readers in favor of focusing on the main takeaway from Justice Driscoll’s recent decision in the case, namely, that once a business owner asserts a claim for judicial dissolution under Section 1104-a of the Business Corporation Law — even if not pleaded in strict accordance with the statute — it’s very difficult to reverse course after the other shareholder timely elects to purchase the petitioner’s shares for fair value under BCL Section 1118. Continue Reading Once Opened, The Door to Judicial Dissolution and Buy-Out Is Hard to Close

shorts

It’s late August, when the lure of the seashore and vacation plans push aside all but the most serious work-related endeavors, and when I share with my readers a few short summaries of recent decisions of interest in business divorce cases.

First, we’ll look at a decision in a dispute among former law firm partners in which the court upheld a partnership agreement amendment by the defendant majority partners, reducing the plaintiff’s percentage interest after he announced his intention to withdraw but before the actual withdrawal became effective. Next up is a relatively rare decision in an LLC dissolution case granting a motion to disqualify defense counsel under the advocate-witness rule of professional conduct. In the third case highlighted below, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed a books-and-records action for lack of standing where the shares issued to the plaintiff never existed.

Court Enforces Eve-of-Withdrawal Reduction of Partnership Interest

Zohar v LaRock, Short Form Order, Index No. 14826/10 [Sup Ct Nassau County July 25, 2016]Article 8-B of New York’s Partnership Law authorizes regulated professional practices to organize as registered limited liability partnerships. The LLP form is highly popular with law firms because it offers the same limited liability protection afforded corporation shareholders and LLC members, except for their own professional negligence or malpractice. The LLP otherwise is subject to the same statutes and common-law rules governing general partnerships, which give partners great leeway in ordering their own affairs in their partnership agreement. Continue Reading Summer Shorts: Partnership Interest Reduction and Other Recent Decisions of Interest

Good faithIf, as appears likely, the drafters of the LLC membership interest repurchase provisions at issue in Saleeby v Remco Maintenance, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 31447(U) [Sup Ct NY County July 25, 2016], thought they were helping the company avoid the possibility of litigation over the value assigned to the outgoing member’s interest, as it turns out they were sorely mistaken.

Poorly drafted or not, the LLC’s managers also likely did themselves and the company no favor by assigning a zero-dollar value to the membership interest of the terminated member in the Saleeby case, and by muddling the timing of the company’s exercise of its repurchase option.

Here, in a nutshell, is what happened in Saleeby as described in Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Anil C. Singh’s decision: In 2005, the defendant company Remco Maintenance, a New York based Delaware LLC, hired plaintiff Saleeby as its President and CEO. Saleeby’s employment agreement granted him a 7.5% Class B membership interest which fully vested by the time he was terminated without cause in February 2012. Over the next two years, Saleeby and the company attempted without success to negotiate their dispute over his termination, severance, vacation pay, and rights to unemployment insurance. In 2014, the company informed Saleeby that in 2013 it had exercised its option under the LLC Agreement to repurchase his membership units at a “fair market value” of zero dollars. Saleeby subsequently filed suit against the LLC for breach of contract and conversion. Continue Reading Good Faith Trumps Sole Discretion in LLC Agreement’s Repurchase Provision