If you haven’t yet listened to prior episodes of the Business Divorce Roundtable (a) it’s time you did and (b) absolutely you won’t want to miss the latest episode (click on the link at the bottom of this post) featuring first-hand, real-life, business divorce stories told by business appraiser Tony Cotrupe of Melioria Advisors (photo left) and attorney Jeffrey Eilender of Schlam Stone & Dolan (photo right).

Tony’s and Jeff’s stories have a common element: both involve the contentious break-up of a poisonous business relationship between two brothers. The similarity ends there. In my interview of Tony, he puts us inside a fast-paced and ultimately successful effort by the feuding second-generation owners of a propane distributorship, guided by their respective lawyers working in collaboration, to avoid litigation by engineering a buy-out of one brother by the other based on Tony’s business appraisal as the jointly retained, independent evaluator. It’s a happy ending to what otherwIse could have turned into a drawn-out courtroom slugfest.

Courtroom slugfest aptly sums up Jeff’s story as counsel for the brother owning the minority interest in Kassab v. Kasab, a case I’ve featured on this blog several times including last month’s post-trial decision giving the other brother the opportunity to buy out the minority interest upon pain of dissolution if he doesn’t (read here, here, and here). Jeff’s insider analysis of the case provides unique insights into a multi-faceted, roller-coaster-ride of a case involving novel issues under the statutes and case law governing business corporations and limited liability companies.

If you’re a lawyer, business appraiser or business owner with a business divorce story you’d like to share for a future podcast, drop me a line at pmahler@farrellfritz.com.

 

Regular readers of this blog know it’s been anything but summer doldrums in the world of business divorce, what with case law developments such as the Appellate Division’s potentially far-reaching ruling on the purposeless purpose clause and LLC dissolution in Mace v Tunick reported in last week’s post, and the astonishing story of minority shareholder oppression in the Twin Bay Village case also reported earlier this month.

This year’s edition of Summer Shorts picks up the summer pace with short summaries of three must-read decisions by New York and Delaware courts on three very different business divorce topics: use of a Special Litigation Committee to evaluate derivative claims brought by LLC members (New York); grounds for dissolution and the court’s remedial powers in shareholder oppression cases (New York); and LLC deadlock dissolution (Delaware).

Appellate Ruling Rejects Appointment of Special Litigation Committee in LLC Derivative Suit Where Not Authorized By Operating Agreement

LNYC Loft, LLC v Hudson Opportunity Fund I, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 06147 [1st Dept Aug. 15, 2017].  In Tzolis v Wolff, New York’s highest court recognized a common-law right of LLC members to sue derivatively on behalf of the LLC. Subsequent lower court decisions have clarified other aspects of the right by analogy to corporation law, such as requiring the plaintiff LLC member to allege pre-suit demand or demand futility. In shareholder derivative suits involving corporations, the board’s inherent authority to appoint a Special Litigation Committee composed of independent and disinterested directors to assess derivative claims is well established and, when properly implemented, can result in the court’s dismissal of derivative claims based on the SLC’s conclusion that the claims do not merit prosecution by the corporation. Continue Reading Summer Shorts: Three Must-Read Decisions

Over the years I’ve litigated and observed countless cases of alleged oppression of minority shareholders by the majority. Oppression can take endlessly different forms, some more crude than others in their execution, some more draconian than others in their effect.

If there was an award for the crudest and most draconian case of shareholder oppression, Matter of Twin Bay Village, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06024 [3d Dept Aug. 3, 2017], decided earlier this month by an upstate appellate panel, would be a serious contender.

The case involves a bitter dispute between two branches of the Chomiak family over a lakefront resort called Twin Bay Village located on beautiful Lake George in upstate New York. In 1957, the husband-and-wife founders, Stephan and Eleonora Chomiak, opened the summer resort on land they owned. They and their two sons, Leo and Vladimir, together ran the business until 1970 when they transferred ownership of the land and business to newly-formed Twin Bay Village, Inc. owned 26% by each parent and 24% by each son. Continue Reading And the Award For Most Oppressive Conduct By a Majority Shareholder Goes to . . .

Gun4HireThe title of this post notwithstanding, the judge’s decision in the recent, high-stakes stock valuation case I’m about to describe, featuring a clash of business appraiser titans whose conclusions of value differed by almost 400%, did not refer to them as “hired guns.”

But the judge did not mince her words in expressing the view that, while “unquestionably qualified to testify on the issue of valuation,” the two experts, whose “zealous advocacy” for their respective clients “compromised their reliability,” offered “wildly disparate” values that were “tailored to suit the party who is paying for them.” Ouch!

The 54-page decision by a Minnesota state court judge in Lund v Lund, Decision, Order & Judgment, No. 27-CV-14-20058 [Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Cnty. June 2, 2017], rejected both experts’ values — $80 million according to the expert for the selling shareholder and $21 million according to the expert for the purchasing company — in arriving at the court’s own value of $45 million for a 25% interest in a chain of 26 upscale grocery stores in the Twin Cities area known as Lunds & Byerlys together with affiliated management and real estate holding companies. Continue Reading Appraisers’ Valuations Are Light-Years Apart, But Does That Make Them Hired Guns?

Buy-SellAt least on paper, shotgun provisions in shareholder and operating agreements provide an elegant and efficient buy-out solution when business owners can’t get along and need a divorce. In a two-owner company, the one who “pulls the trigger” names a price at which he or she either will buy the other’s interest or sell to the other. The other owner has a specified amount of time to decide which. Since the offeror doesn’t know who will be the buyer, in theory there’s a great incentive to name an objectively fair price. The agreement usually also will prescribe payment terms. No need for appraisal. No fuss. No muss.

I’m not aware of any data-based studies on the subject, but I believe experienced lawyers would concur that shotgun clauses, although frequently included in owner agreements, are rarely invoked. Why is that? I can only speculate that owners generally prefer other ways to achieve a breakup without the uncertainty of knowing who will end up with the business. Also, owners are reluctant to be the trigger-puller, that is, there’s a natural preference to be the one with the option to buy or sell at a price named by the other.

Shotguns also can suffer from informational and financial asymmetries between the owners, a problem highlighted in my two-part, online interview of Professors Landeo and Spier some years ago (here and here). As Professor Spier described it: Continue Reading Aim Carefully Before Pulling Trigger on Shotgun Buy-Sell Agreement

No U TurnArticle 11 of the Business Corporation Law governs dissolution of closely held New York business corporations. Article 11 has existed, more or less in its current form, for decades. Some of its provisions have been heavily litigated, including Sections 1104 and 1104-a governing judicial dissolution for deadlock and oppression, and Section 1118 governing buyout of a minority’s interest in an oppression proceeding. Other provisions have received surprisingly little attention.

In Morizio v Roeder, 2017 NY Slip Op 50248(U) [Sup Ct Albany County Feb. 17, 2017], Albany County Commercial Division Justice Richard M. Platkin addressed one of these latter, relatively-overlooked sections.

Section 1116 of the Business Corporation Law governs the circumstances in which a party who sues for dissolution may later change his or her mind and withdraw the claim for dissolution. The key language of the statute provides that a petitioner who wishes to withdraw his or her claim must “establish” to the court “that the cause for dissolution did not exist or no longer exists.”

What does that mean? Only a few courts have considered the issue, including a decision last year by Justice Timothy Driscoll in the Cardino case. As it turns out, a leading case to consider the legal standard to withdraw a dissolution claim was an earlier decision in the Morizio litigation. Continue Reading Withdraw a Dissolution Claim? Not So Fast

crazyWhenever I contemplate New York’s unusual case law on the discount for lack of marketability (DLOM) in statutory fair value buy-out proceedings, I cast my eyes westward, to the far banks of the Hudson River, and take comfort in the fact it could be worse — I could be in New Jersey.

A “business appraiser’s nightmare” is how Chris Mercer described New Jersey’s “bad behavior discount” in his commentary on the Wisniewski v Walsh case decided a little over a year ago by a New Jersey appellate court, in which it affirmed the trial court’s application of a 25% DLOM seemingly plucked out of thin air, and notwithstanding what the trial court itself admitted were “strong indicators of liquidity,” for the stated purpose of penalizing the selling shareholder for his oppressive behavior toward the other shareholders — behavior that in no way harmed the corporation’s business or affected its marketability!

Now comes another New Jersey trial court decision in another fair value buy-out case, and guess what? The court applied the same 25% DLOM without any discussion of the factors supporting its application or quantification other than the court’s finding that the selling shareholder was guilty of oppressive conduct against the purchasing shareholder.

In Parker v Parker, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2720 [Dec. 22, 2016], two brothers, Richard and Steven Parker, took over from their parents and for the next 25 years operated as 50/50 owners a wholesale flower business and a separately incorporated wholesale plant business which eventually became a garden center. Richard ran the flower business and Steven the garden business as separate fiefdoms with minimal overlap. Continue Reading Has New Jersey Gone Off Its DLOM Rocker?


shutterstock_581026324As promised in the postscript to last week’s post about the appellate ruling in the Gould case, affirming Justice Platkin’s order granting the oppressed minority shareholder’s dissolution petition involving a pair of construction firms, we now arrive at Justice Platkin’s subsequent determination of the fair value of the minority shareholder’s equity stake.

The decision raises several important issues of interest to business appraisers and business divorce counsel, including selection of tax rates, the appropriate look-back period in determining historical earnings, adjustments for non-arm’s length inter-company transactions, and use of the market approach.

Justice Platkin’s valuation ruling last month in Matter of Digeser v Flach [Gould Erectors & Rigging, Inc.], 2017 NY Slip Op 50220(U) [Sup Ct Albany County Jan. 31, 2017], is the culmination of an oppressed minority shareholder dissolution petition filed in April 2013. In his November 2015 post-trial decision, which I wrote about here, Justice Platkin found that Digeser, a minority shareholder in the two corporations, established grounds for dissolution based on oppression, but he left open the question of remedy. Continue Reading Business Appraisers Spar Over Tax Rates, Market Approach and Other Key Issues in Fair Value Buy-Out Case

exitDoes a shareholder have a fiduciary duty not to exercise a contractual right under the shareholders’ agreement to resign and demand a buy-out of his shares by the financially distressed corporation, particularly when the corporation’s default would trigger the other shareholders’ personal guarantees?

That’s the intriguing question posed in an unpublished decision last month by Nassau County Commercial Division Justice Vito M. DeStefano in Mondschein v Badillo, Decision and Order, Index No. 600307/14 [Sup Ct Nassau County Jan. 12, 2017], where a physician resigned from his struggling medical professional corporation amidst ultimately unsuccessful efforts to merge with another practice, and who then brought suit against the P.C., his fellow shareholders, and a related realty company that owned the practice’s medical office, to enforce his buy-out and retirement rights under the various agreements governing the two entities.

The agreements essentially gave senior physician-shareholders the right to retire with an obligatory buy-out by the entities of their equity interests in the practice and the realty, as well as payment of specified retirement benefits. In addition, each shareholder gave a joint-and-several personal guarantee of each other shareholder’s rights to payment. Continue Reading Race to the Exit as Professional Practice Falters

4CThe case I’m about to describe involves an unusual clash of two fundamental principles of corporate governance for closely held corporations:

Principle No. 1:  Stock transfer restrictions may be used to preserve continuity of ownership and management within a family or other control group, without violating the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation of property.

Principle No. 2:  Controllers owe a fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders fairly and evenly when authorizing and issuing new shares, and must have a bona fide business purpose for any departure from precisely uniform treatment.

The clash came to a head in a decision this month by Brooklyn Commercial Division Justice Lawrence Knipel involving 4C Foods, a well-known, fourth generation, family-owned business that manufactures and markets under the 4C® brand grated Italian cheeses, bread crumbs, iced tea, and drink mixes. The suit pits Nathan Celauro, a non-managing, minority owner holding directly or beneficially about 22% of 4C’s voting and non-voting shares, against his cousin John Celauro, the managing majority shareholder who controls or has aligned with him the remaining 78%. (Disclosure: Farrell Fritz represents the minority shareholder in the case.)

The case and Justice Knipel’s decision in Celauro v 4C Foods Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 31917(U) [Sup Ct Kings County Oct. 12, 2016], is the latest in a series of litigations and court rulings between two factions of the Celauro family beginning around 2005, following the death of Nathan’s father the year before. About 20% of the father’s voting and non-voting shares passed to his wife either directly or to trusts under her control, with the remaining 2% going directly to Nathan. Continue Reading Too Clever By Half? Court Permits Suit Challenging Share Increase Tied to Transfer Restrictions