1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	GEOFFREY GELMAN,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 37 ANTONIO BUEHLER,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 February 7, 2013
11	restuary 7, 2013
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
16	Appearances:
17	PAUL R. NIEHAUS, ESQ.
18	NIEHAUS LLP Attorneys for Appellant
19	1359 Broadway Suite 2001
20	New York, NY 10018
21	GEOFFREY GELMAN PRO SE
	Respondent
22	14 Berkeley Place Brooklyn, NY 11217
23	BLOOKIYII, NI 11217
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25	Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 37. And do
2	you want any rebuttal time, counselor?
3	MR. NIEHAUS: Please. Two minutes.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Go
5	ahead, sure.
6	MR. NIEHAUS: Thank you, Your Honor. Paul
7	Niehaus of Niehaus LLP for defendant-appellant
8	Antonio Buehler. May it please the Court.
9	This case presents the Court with two
10	distinct questions. The first is whether the
11	plaintiff in this case has alleged that the parties
12	entered into a partnership for a particular
13	undertaking, or for a definite term
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the what
15	is the particular undertaking? Let's start with
16	that.
17	MR. NIEHAUS: There's none none been
18	alleged here, Your Honor. What's been alleged in
19	this case is that the parties were going to form a
20	search fund of indeterminate length, identify some
21	business in some unidentified field
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you know the
23	general nature, right? I mean, it's
24	MR. NIEHAUS: Well
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: pretty clear.

1	MR. NIEHAUS: your
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's put it this
3	way. It's pretty clear in a most general way what
4	the undertaking is. But is it a particular
5	undertaking?
6	MR. NIEHAUS: That's basically the
7	question, Your Honor.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
9	MR. NIEHAUS: Yes. And that's a
10	distinction that some courts have recognized. There
11	can be a general purpose to a partnership, but that
12	doesn't qualify as a particular undertaking.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What does? What
14	does? What's a particular undertaking?
15	MR. NIEHAUS: What qualifies as a
16	particular undertaking under
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Again, you still have
18	this other issue of
19	MR. NIEHAUS: Absolutely. Definite time.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: indefinite,
21	which we'll deal with. Go ahead.
22	MR. NIEHAUS: A particular undertaking,
23	Your Honor, has to identify a specific business. It
24	has to identify something that the parties can know
25	when they enter into their partnership

1	JUDGE READ: That's kind of
2	MR. NIEHAUS: when it
3	JUDGE READ: antithetical to the
4	nature of a search fund, though, isn't it?
5	MR. NIEHAUS: Well, Your Honor, a search
6	fund operating a search fund is something that
7	is the classic example of something of an
8	indeterminate length. It's an ongoing
9	JUDGE READ: So can you ever
10	MR. NIEHAUS: business.
11	JUDGE READ: can you ever have such a
12	partnership to undertake a search fund, or is it just
13	inherently impossible with that type of
14	MR. NIEHAUS: You could
15	JUDGE READ: a mercurial vehicle?
16	MR. NIEHAUS: No, no. You could have a
17	search fund with a specific time frame. But that
18	would fall under the other rubric of definite time.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: A time frame, or what
20	about a particular, more defined purpose?
21	MR. NIEHAUS: Well
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Would that do it?
23	MR. NIEHAUS: if it were a particular
24	purpose
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Like a search

1	MR. NIEHAUS: yes.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: like that
3	a search fund
4	JUDGE GRAFFEO: If they said
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: for something.
6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: hi-tech firms. Would
7	that be specific enough?
8	MR. NIEHAUS: I don't think that would be
9	sufficient, Your Honor.
10	JUDGE GRAFFEO: They have to name a
11	particular company that's in existence?
12	MR. NIEHAUS: In this particular instance,
13	I believe that you do. Because what you're trying to
14	do is allow the parties to know from the beginning
15	what they have to accomplish in order to conclude the
16	partnership.
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's a little different,
18	though, than the real estate cases where they
19	identify a particular parcel that they're going to
20	develop. I mean
21	MR. NIEHAUS: It is a little bit different.
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: here the whole
23	purpose was to investigate different types of
24	corporate opportunities
25	MR. NIEHAUS: Well, but

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - wasn't it? 2 MR. NIEHAUS: - - - but again, Your Honor, 3 we had that argument come in kind of at the last 4 minute, during the briefing in this case. What had 5 previously been said was, we're going to identify a 6 business and run it, and make - - - you know, increase its value, and then we're going to sell it 7 8 some way. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: If you were - - -10 MR. NIEHAUS: But what you - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - if you were - - -12 let's say you got together with Magic Johnson and 13 said we're going to get together and find a sports 14 team for the city of Los Angeles, that would be a 15 purpose that would fit, right? 16 MR. NIEHAUS: If you were going to say our 17 particular purpose is to find a sports team to bring 18 to the city of Los Angeles, and you could say with 19 particularity, when that particular undertaking was 20 going to be achieved, and you could stick a pin in it 21 and say we're done, then yes. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But why - - - do you 23 have - - -2.4 MR. NIEHAUS: But you have to - - -25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - do you have to

say when it's going to be achieved if you - - - if, 1 2 in answer to Judge Pigott's question, we know that's 3 the undertaking? Are they two different things? 4 do the - - - because you're not going into that first 5 criteria. If you said we're going to buy a ball team 6 or whatever it is for Los Angeles, would that be 7 enough without saying when that's going to happen? 8 MR. NIEHAUS: Assuming that you can know 9 when that has been achieved, when that undertaking 10 has been achieved. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You mean you either 12 buy it or you don't? 13 MR. NIEHAUS: Well, but again, now you've 14 just added the other issue. And you do have to look 15 at both sides of this equation, okay? In an event 16 where - - - the reason that all of the particular 17 undertaking cases identify and have already figured 18 out what the particular parcel of land or business 19 is, is because you know that the conclusion of your 20 involvement with that business or land - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if you said in 22 Judge Pigott's hypothetical - - -23 MR. NIEHAUS: Um-hum.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the undertaking

is to buy a baseball team for the city of Los

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1	Angeles, and it doesn't say, you know, if we don't
2	get it by two years from now it's over, is it good
3	enough?
4	MR. NIEHAUS: No, it is not. It is not
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6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What would you
7	MR. NIEHAUS: good enough in the
8	_
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: what would you
10	need to say?
11	MR. NIEHAUS: What you need in that case is
12	the other side of this equation, a time limit. If
13	you say we are going to
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There needs to be
15	some time line to have a particular
16	MR. NIEHAUS: No. No. You need to know -
17	
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You need both?
19	MR. NIEHAUS: when you need one
20	or the other, definitively.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So why so why
22	do you need a time line if it's a particular kind of
23	business?
24	MR. NIEHAUS: Because in this case, when
25	you say we're going to buy

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Particular
2	undertaking.
3	MR. NIEHAUS: we're going to buy a
4	baseball team, you don't know that that event is
5	going to occur. You might not be able to buy it.
6	JUDGE SMITH: Well, how is how is
7	Judge Pigott's hypothetical different from that
8	Hardin case, which I the only I've may be
9	the only one with a particular undertaking in the
10	history of the world. But they said we're going to
11	buy this company and sell it again. Is it
12	MR. NIEHAUS: But again
13	JUDGE SMITH: and that was enough.
14	MR. NIEHAUS: you've identified that
15	particular company. You can
16	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, so if it said if
17	it said we're going to buy the Atlanta Braves and
18	move them to Los Angeles, that would be a particular
19	undertaking?
20	MR. NIEHAUS: That would, in fact
21	that would be a
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Without a
23	MR. NIEHAUS: particular undertaking.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: time frame?
25	MR. NIEHAUS: Well, again, Your Honor, if

1 you can determine that the particular undertaking has 2 occurred or has definitively failed - - - and that's 3 the issue - - - we have - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, if you want to 4 5 buy - - - if you want to buy the Atlantic (sic) 6 Braves, either you're going to buy them - - - Atlanta 7 Braves, you're either going to buy them or not buy 8 them, right? 9 MR. NIEHAUS: That's exactly right. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So that would be 11 good. 12 MR. NIEHAUS: That would be fair enough. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about, though, 14 Judge Graffeo's question. If you don't know what you 15 want to buy, but you want to do some investment, is 16 that ever good enough? 17 MR. NIEHAUS: That's never good enough, 18 Your Honor. That's never good enough. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If you said we're 20 going to do some investment - - - similar to the 21 facts in this case - - - and said we're going to do 22 them by X date, that's our goal, that's the duration 23 of this, we're going to do it. The business lasts on 2.4 those two years, four years, okay?

MR. NIEHAUS: No problem. That's

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1	absolutely perfect. And again, the underlying
2	purpose for both sides of this equation, either a
3	particular undertaking or the definite time, is so
4	that the parties know when they get involved what
5	they're getting involved with.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why is it this
7	definite time? You do sort of say the duration of
8	how long this operation may will last.
9	MR. NIEHAUS: It's not a definite time.
10	Because a definite time would be
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what is it, when
12	it says
13	MR. NIEHAUS: What is it?
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: years?
15	MR. NIEHAUS: Well
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: When you talk about
17	the budget for X number of years and then we might
18	solicit more. You talk about the operation
19	operating, how long it might last. What is that
20	stuff? What is
21	MR. NIEHAUS: It's not a
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: that's not a -
23	
24	MR. NIEHAUS: definite time.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is

MR. NIEHAUS: Whatever it is, it's not a definite time.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is it in this agreement?

MR. NIEHAUS: They - - - again, there is no specific duration. He - - - the plaintiff has alleged at different times and for different purposes, that the partnership could have been concluded in less than a year - - - may have made that argument for statute of fraud purposes - - - or it could last as long as nine years. But even at that point, there is no specific determination of how it is supposed to end. There is this claim that, well, we're going to monetize it. We're going to have some liquidity event. We're going to sell the business. Well, you haven't said how you're going to do that, haven't said for how much, haven't said how you're going to split that money with the investors. You haven't said that the partnership would necessarily dissolve just because it came into possession, for example, of some IPO shares.

You haven't established a specific time.

All that those things do is revert back to the undertaking. If the particular undertaking - - - if there were a particular undertaking identified here,

1 and the parties knew going in, it might take a year, 2 and it might take nine years, that's okay. That's 3 fine. Because they know from the beginning what they're getting theirselves into - - -4 5 JUDGE READ: But isn't that, again, kind of totally antithetical to the whole notion of a search 6 7 fund? MR. NIEHAUS: I don't think it is. Because 8 9 again, if you're saying to yourself, I am going to 10 get involved in this search fund business, and I am going to identify something, you have to know when 11 12 that is going to end or how that is going to end. 13 And that's just what we don't have here. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it's - - - so it's 14 15 on the particular undertaking, it can't work. If you 16 have a search fund, you've got to go to a definitive 17 time. Because it can't work - - -MR. NIEHAUS: Indeed, Your Honor. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - as a particular 2.0 undertaking. 21 MR. NIEHAUS: That's correct, Your Honor. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. 23 MR. NIEHAUS: 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have some 25 rebuttal.

Sir?

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	MR. GE	LMAN: Ma	y it	please	the	Court,	my
name is (	Geoffrey	Gelman.	I'm	the pla	ainti	lff-	
responde	nt. I'm	represen	ting	myself.			

Well, I can address a couple of these points. My view is that the entire inquiry is when is this going to end? Does it end at some discernible time in the future, not necessarily a time that you can predict exactly in advance, but whether when you get to that point, do you know that it's over or not? And clearly the case is here that you do know when it's over; when we've created this liquidity event. In other words - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're saying these two issues that were talked about, one is a particular undertaking, one is a definitive time, you're saying that you knew that - - or both parties should have known that the general nature of this undertaking, and then that it ends when there's a liquidity event? And so - - -

MR. GELMAN: That's right.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - therefore that meets this standard we're talking about of a definite time? Is that your argument?

MR. GELMAN: I think it meets the standard

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Put it in your words.

I'm just trying to make it easier.

MR. GELMAN: Well, I think it meets the standard of particular undertaking, the fact that we know what it is - - - what event is going to conclude the partnership.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But if two people get

together and say, you know what, we're talented

people, why don't we - - why don't we work together

until we make a million dollars each; in your view,

is that a partnership that's cognizable?

MR. GELMAN: Well, I believe that doesn't meet the definition of a valid partnership, because a partnership must be two people who get together and operate a business for profit.

DUDGE PIGOTT: What's the difference between what I said and yours? You're saying liquidity. You're saying we're going to work to - - - we're going to work together, find something, work with that something until we make money, and then we're going to sell it. That's so ephemeral, I mean, when do you - - - when do you know if you - - -

MR. GELMAN: Well - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you've - - -

MR. GELMAN: - - - a search fund is a well-1 2 known entity. There's been twenty years' worth of 3 search funds started before ours. So it is an investment fund, and it does have - - -4 5 JUDGE SMITH: But it's only - - - it's only a search fund until you fund something. And then the 6 7 partnership doesn't end when you fund it. You 8 continue to run the business, right? 9 MR. GELMAN: Right. That's the unique 10 aspect of a search fund is that the investment 11 managers, once they find the business to acquire they 12 then step in as the managers of that business. 13 JUDGE SMITH: Would it be - - - to put this 14 in plain English, isn't this - - - isn't the essence 15 of the deal, we're going to look for a business to invest in; we're going to find it; and we're going to 16 17 run it until we have a chance to cash out? Isn't that the gist of it? 18 19 That's the idea. We do set MR. GELMAN: 2.0 time limitations on it, because investors have their 21 money tied up and unavailable. So we - - -22 JUDGE SMITH: The time limitations aren't 23 hard and fast, though, are they? 2.4 MR. GELMAN: They were meant to guide our 25 objectives, but - - - and we would do everything

possible to meet them. But if we didn't create the liquidity event at seven years, we would have to continue and - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did you have a period - - - did your agreement set a period of time for obtaining the investments? I think you wanted, what, 600,000 dollars from investors?

MR. GELMAN: Right.

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Was there a period of time that you had to meet that level of investment by a certain date?

MR. GELMAN: It was meant to be a few months. We didn't set a precise date. But by implication, we weren't making any money ourselves, so we had to either raise that money or we wouldn't be able to afford our own basic living expenses.

JUDGE PIGOTT: What are you going to buy for 600 grand? I mean, was there a plan here?

MR. GELMAN: Yes. The 600,000 paid for two years' worth of searching. So we anticipated going to trade shows, visiting different companies all over the United States, talking to business brokers, talking to investment bankers. There would be a long period of due diligence, once we found a candidate business, where we'd have to analyze it and make sure

the financials were okay.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Were you looking for a fast-food restaurant or a nuclear plant or a military operation? I mean, how do you - - -

MR. GELMAN: Well - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Because you're going to run it. You've got to have some skill, I would assume.

MR. GELMAN: Right. We were going to focus on areas where we thought our backgrounds would be most applicable. My partner has a background in logistics, so things involving supply chains would be one good candidate. I had a background in technology, so we would look at businesses where we could apply technology to increase the value in different ways.

We would look at businesses where there were certain assets that weren't being fully utilized. But there were different financial criteria we were looking at as well. Businesses with stable cash flows; businesses where the industry was fairly predictable, where we weren't relying on fads or seasonal - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: What's an example? What'd you have in your mind when you're getting into this? Where did you see yourself in seven years?

MR. GELMAN: All right. Well, one example, we talked about a janitorial services type business. So, you know, we'd look at companies that - - - that went in and cleaned offices, and we would see if we could improve that and expand that. We - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Was there a reason why the two of you didn't put your plan in writing? Was there a reason that you made this an oral agreement?

MR. GELMAN: Well, the agreement - - - it happened over a period of time. It was - - - my partner introduced me to the concept of a search fund. And we were discussing how it would work for a month. And at the end of the month I said okay, I was in.

It was mostly a matter of trust. I mean, I thought - - and we thought we understood what a search fund was, because there's an extensive amount of literature on search funds. And both of us had read through that literature and discussed that. So when we said we were doing a search fund, we by implication, were going to follow the template of all of the search funds that had been done before us.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: How long were you looking for investors before he told you he didn't want to pursue this any longer?

1 MR. GELMAN: It was a little over four 2 months. 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Had there been any investments up to that point in time? 4 5 MR. GELMAN: Yes. The way it worked is, we were raising 600,000 dollars. And it's unfair for 6 7 any one investor to put his money in first until the rest of the money is raised. So the way it worked is 8 9 we would secure the entire 600,000 dollars' worth of 10 commitments before we actually took money from any 11 one investor. JUDGE GRAFFEO: So neither of you were 12 13 being paid any salary, then, for those four months? 14 MR. GELMAN: That's right. And to me, 15 that's another reason why this is a particular 16 undertaking. Because our salary and our compensation 17 - - - most of our compensation would not occur until the liquidity event. And so it makes no sense that 18 19 we could be working without pay or without much 20 compensation in anticipation of a payoff, and have 21 someone just be able to walk out in the middle of it. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Anything else? Keep 23 going. Don't hesitate. 2.4 MR. GELMAN: All right. Let me see if I

can - - - let me - - - again, my position is that

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this turns on the conclusion. But I want to address one of the defendant's points, which is, well, we didn't know at the outset what we're going to be doing. And I think it's very clear that come the two-year mark after the search, we would know a particular business. So there would be one business.

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If for some reason we were not able to find that business, the search would be over. So there's really no situation where the defendant is bound for some indeterminate period of time not knowing what he's going to do.

OHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't it kind of an ongoing thing? This is kind of like an ongoing profit-making functions of - - - like a perpetual partnership that you just - - - isn't that more what it's like? What is it? Does it have a beginning and an end, I guess is what I'm saying.

MR. GELMAN: Well, one of the main differences - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying he had this liquidity event.

MR. GELMAN: Right. And that's how it differs from, say, a traditional private equity fund that buys and sells multiple businesses or a venture capital fund. We were in it for only one business

1	and we were going to return invested funds
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, you're in it
3	for a business that to find a business, right?
4	MR. GELMAN: Right. The investment fund -
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6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The business of
7	finding a business.
8	MR. GELMAN: That's right. The purpose of
9	the investment fund, which was the search fund, was
10	to invest in a single other business and increase the
11	value of that business and sell it. But that would
12	be the only thing it did. And after that, the
13	partnership would wind up.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Do you have
15	anything else? Your time is just about up, but feel
16	free
17	MR. GELMAN: Okay, I think that's
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you're okay?
19	Okay.
20	MR. GELMAN: That does it. Thank you.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
22	Counselor?
23	MR. NIEHAUS: Thank you. Well
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What precedent of the few
25	cases that are out there do you think this is closest

to? Because it's not really like the two real estate

cases - - 
MR. NIEHAUS: No, it's - - -

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Sanley or - - -

MR. NIEHAUS: - - - it's not - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - St. Lawrence.

MR. NIEHAUS: - - - actually. No. Because in those cases, the actual real estate had been specifically identified.

I actually think this is closest - - - and I think what this court should look to is the Girard Bank case out of Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Page v. Page case out of the California Supreme Court. That's a 1961 case. And in both of those cases, the courts both subtly and explicitly draw a distinction between statements of general purpose versus particular undertakings.

And what we have here is a statement of general purpose. And it's very much like the hypothetical posed over here which I was going to raise as my own, but thank you. You can have a statement of general purpose that doesn't constitute a particular undertaking. So in the Girard case, you had a family business that was leasing land and running things and mining and logging and all sorts

1	of things like that. But they didn't have as a
2	specific purpose
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why do you why
4	do you think there's such a dearth of cases in New
5	York about this?
6	MR. NIEHAUS: Well, hopefully, it's because
7	people are following this court's admonition that
8	your partnership agreement should be in writing. And
9	in fact, what we have
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you think that's
11	the real problem here?
12	MR. NIEHAUS: Well, I don't think it's a
13	problem. I think that in this case, the parties were
14	actually moving towards that, because they actually
15	had, as the record shows, an LLC operating agreement.
16	And you all know that
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can you have an oral
18	agreement that is a particular undertaking
19	MR. NIEHAUS: Absolutely.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: with definite -
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22	MR. NIEHAUS: Absolutely. You absolutely
23	can. But are you going to invest any portion of
24	600,000 dollars or any portion of whatever millions
25	of dollars it was going to take to buy this

unidentified business on the basis of an oral partnership? Of course you're not. They - - 
JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the downside of an

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answer?

MR. NIEHAUS: I'm sorry?

JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the downside of letting - - - of filing an answer and having some discovery?

MR. NIEHAUS: Well, the downside, of course, is that my client gets involved in all sorts of actual disputes and all sorts of litigation. And this is not a factual question. We're not saying that there was no partnership. We're not disputing that. We're saying that, just like this court has said, you need to be able to identify facts. You can't just plead boilerplate. You can't just say we had a contract and he broke it and I'm damaged. You have to plead the individual facts in order to form a gatekeeping function, to identify for the defendant what he's accused of doing wrong, and to identify for the court what it is that they can infer was actually going on between these parties; that the court can infer that a particular undertaking had been agreed to by the parties.

Without that, you just got boilerplate

1	statements of general purpose, and it's not worth the
2	court's time.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
4	Thank you
5	MR. NIEHAUS: Thank you very much.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: both.
7	Appreciate it.
8	(Court is adjourned)
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## CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Geoffrey Gelman v. Antonio Buehler, No. 37 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the

Penina waieh.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

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proceedings.

Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street

Suite # 607

New York, NY 10040

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