FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/10/2015 11:51 AM INDEX NO. 651863/2012

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/10/2015

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 159

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK: CIVIL TERM PART 48 CULLIGAN SOFT WATER COMPANY; CECIL R. HALL; C&D OF ROCHESTER, LLC; DRIESSEN WATER, INC.; MICHAEL A. BANNISTER; T&B ENTERPRISES, INC.; CALIFORNIA WATER & FILTER, INC.; SHAR SHER I, INC.; WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT, INC.; CULLIGAN SOUTHWEST, INC.; CAREY WATER CONDITIONING, INC.; MICHAEL CAREY; ERIC B. CLARKE; CULLIGAN WATER CONDITIONING (BARRIE) LIMITED; ARTHUR H. COOKSEY, JR.; CORBETT'S WATER CONDITIONING, INC.; GLEN CRAVEN; QUALITY WATER WORKS, INC.; DONALD R. DAMMEL; MAYER SOFT WATER COMPANY; TIMOTHY FATHEREE AND SUE FATHEREE; CLEAN WATER, INC.; CATHERINE GILBY; CANATXX, INC.; QUALITY WATER ENTERPRISESE, INC.; ROBERT R. HEFFERNAN; CHARLES F. HURST; KARGER ENTERPRISESE, INC.; KEPPLER WATER TREATMENT, INC.; ROBERT KIZMAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE ROBERT AND TRACY KITZMAN TRUST; LADWIG ENTERPRISES, INC.; RICHARD LAMBERT AND MARIANNE CONRAD; LOW COUNTRY WATER CONDITIONING, INC.; JEFFREY L. LARSON; MICHAEL G. MACAULAY; VETTERS, INC.; ROBERT W. MCCOLLUM AND BARBARA N. MCCOLLUM; RICHARD C. MEIER; DONALD E. MEREDITH; MILLER'S WATER CONDITIONING, INC.; CLEANWATER CORPORATION OF AMERICA; JOHN MOLLMAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE MOLLMAN FAMILY TRUST; THE GOOD WATER COMPANY LTD.; E&H PARKS, INC.; MAUMEE VALLEY BOTTLERS, INC.; SCHRY WATER CONDITIONING, INC.; SCHRY WATER TREATMENT, INC.;

9 WINSLOW STENSENG; STEWART WATER

CONDITIONING, LTD.; BRET P. TANGLEY;

B.A.R. WATER CORPORATION; TRILLI

HOLDINGS, INC.; BRUCE VAN CAMP; WALTER C.

21 VOIGT AS TRUSTEE FOR THE WALTER C. VOIGT REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST; MARIN H20, INC.;

| ALLAN C. WINDOVER,

Plaintiffs,

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– against –

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1 2 3 4 5 6	CLAYTON DUBILIER & RICE, LLC; CLAYTON DUBILIER & RICE, INC.; CLAYTON DUBILIER & RICE FUND VI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; GEORGE W. TAMKE; DAVID H. WASSERMAN; MARK SEALS; BRUNO DESCHAMPS; NATHAN K. SLEEPER; MICHAEL J. DURHAM; DANIEL R. FREDRICKSON; THOMAS A. HAYS; JAMES USELTON; ANGELO, GORDON & CO., L.P.; SILVER OAK CAPITAL, L.L.C.; CENTERBRIDGE SPECIAL CREDIT PARTNERS, L.P.; CCP ACQUISITION HOLDING, L.L.C.; CULLIGAN LTD, as nominal defendant; and JOHN DOES 1-50, Defendants.	
8 9	Ne	Centre Street Way York, New York Way 28, 2015
10	BEFORE:	2, 20, 2020
11	THE HON. JEFFREY K. O.	ING, J.S.C.
12	APPEARANCES:	on ha spee
13	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:	mm seq.
14 15 16	EINBINDER & DUNN 104 West 40th Street New York, New York 10018 BY: STEPHANIE BLUMSTEIN, ESQ.	10:007
17	SINGLER P.C. 127 South Main Street Sebastopol, California 95472 BY: PETER A. SINGLER, ESQ.	
18 ' 19	THEO S. ARNOLD, ESQ.	
20	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	•
21	DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON 919 Third Avenue	
22	New York, New York 10022 BY: SHANNON ROSE SELDEN, ESQ.	
23	DAVID GOPSTEIN, ESQ.	ACK L. MORELLI
24	11	enior Court Reporter

THE COURT: The Court has before it the matter of Culligan Soft Water Company, et al. versus Clayton Dubilier & Rice, et al., index 651863 of 2012. This is Motion Sequence Number 7, which is a motion by certain defendants to dismiss the action against them. I note for the record that this is a third amended verified complaint. This is the fourth complaint that's being served in this action here.

Having said that, parties enter their appearances for the record. For the plaintiff.

MS. BLUMSTEIN: Stephanie Blumstein, from Einbinder & Dunn, for the plaintiffs.

MR. SINGLER: Good morning. Peter Singler, appearing for pro hac for the derivative plaintiffs, plaintiff Culligan Soft Water, et al. and on behalf of Culligan Limited. I also have with me Theo Arnold, an associate in my office.

THE COURT: Thank you. For the defendants.

MS. SELDEN: Good morning. Shannon Selden of Debevoise & Plimpton, for Clayton Dubilier & Rice, LLC, for the individual director defendants for Culligan Limited, the nominal defendant, and for CD&R Fund VI, which is a party that has been dismissed from this litigation.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So, for the record, I was reading over the briefs yesterday. I just have to get one thing clear that I make sure of, this action is based on a 2007 recapitalization, correct? This action is based on that 2007 recap?

MR. SINGLER: Primarily, not entirely, no.

THE COURT: The dividends that flow from there,
the management fees, but all stem around the 2007
activities, correct?

MR. SINGLER: The main distribution, yes.

THE COURT: The only reason I ask that, I was reading the briefs here, something jarred me and I thought that I missed something. Where, unless tell me if I'm wrong, in your reply brief you had mentioned a 2012 restructuring, that's not -- that's a typo or there was a 2012 restructuring?

MS. SELDEN: There was a 2012 restructuring. That was the deal in which Centerbridge and Angelo Gordon, the former lenders were involved. There were allegations related to that restructuring. But they are out now so what remains is the allegations related to the 2007 dividend.

THE COURT: I just wanted to clarify that I didn't miss a transaction in this whole thing.

MS. SELDEN: No, you're exactly right, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Got it. Thank you. All right, so we got that out of the way. All right, this is now the fourth complaint you have in this derivative lawsuit. I have one question to ask you -- well, let's just put for the record how many causes of action are being asserted here.

There are seven causes of action being asserted. The first is breach of fiduciary duty against the director defendants and CD&R. The second is for illegal dividend against of the director defendants. The third is for fraudulent conveyances against the director defendants and other defendants. And the fourth is for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. The fifth is for corporate waste. The sixth is for unjust enrichment. And the seventh is for constructive trust. Those are the seven causes of action that are in play in this action.

I also note for the record that this case is now back here subsequent to an appeal which was modified with respect to my decision -- my prior decision was to dismiss the action in total. The 1st Department modified that saying that I needed to look at New York law with respect to certain of these claims and also because certain of these defendants the Bermuda law didn't apply to them. So they said issues of plaintiffs' standing to bring a

shareholder derivative action is governed by New York law and not Bermuda law. And we're back here. The issue is standing. This case did not say that you had standing. Because they couldn't have said that because I never addressed the standing issue under New York law on the first go around. So when you said in your briefs here that the standing issue has been decided by the 1st Department; I don't think so. So just want to clarify that. Right?

MR. SINGLER: Well, Your Honor, I think that the Appellate Department did address it. And --

THE COURT: Where do they say that? Where do they say that you have standing? Because they couldn't have said that because I never, I never addressed the New York law issue because they said that because I just only focused on Bermuda law. And then they said go back because it found, the Court found that Bermuda law didn't apply to this case. "And the motion Court did not reach defendants' arguments that the complaint should be dismissed even if New York law applied. We remand so that the Court may consider those arguments."

So where does it say that you've got standing so that we don't need to talk about that on the first one right now?

MR. SINGLER: Like in particular the second

cause of action. It said under 626 and 626 (a) provides the standing of 719, 510.

THE COURT: 626 provides three branches (a),

(b), (c). (C) is the derivative portion. (C) is where

you have to make demand and demand futility. (a) and (b)

talk about other issues. So when they satisfy 626

generally, they don't say 626 (c), do they? I don't think

that they said 626 --

MR. SINGLER: I think that they came out and said we've alleged an illegal dividend which we have a right to bring under 626, incorporating 510. It's somewhat academic.

get to that in a minute. It's not academic. We're going to get to that in a minute. It's not academic, it's very important. That's why we're addressing that issue first. Because whether or not they decide a standing is very important. Because at this point this decision, this 1st Department decision 118 AD3d 422, while you may have a claim for illegal dividend, while you may have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 626 or BCL 1317, BCL 1317 and 1319, while you may have those claims the question is, do you have the right to assert those claims. Those are two separate analyses that have to be done. So that I'm not disagreeing with you that the 1st Department says you may have those claims, the question is do you have the

right to assert those claims now.

MR. SINGLER: I understand, Your Honor. I think we're kind of splitting hairs. We're probably saying the same thing.

THE COURT: Oh no.

MR. SINGLER: If I may. So, I think that what defendants are bringing up right now is whether or not we have met the requirements of 626.

THE COURT: (C).

MR. SINGLER: (C). If we made a demand and pled futility have we met those standard. Assuming that we met those standards then I believe that the standing issue is resolved because the --

THE COURT: That's a big if. The question is, have you met or have you pleaded sufficiently to get over 626 (c), which is now in play, which is now what I'm required to analyze this action or the remaining causes of action under in terms of whether or not you have standing to assert those causes of action. That's where we're at.

Your response?

MS. SELDEN: Yes, Your Honor. I think that you're exactly right with respect to the 1st Department decision on standing, where there is no substantive decision that these plaintiffs have standing to bring claims on behalf of Culligan Limited.

THE COURT: I think that they merely said that you may have those causes of action under 626 illegal dividends, whatever. That is a far cry from saying that you can assert those claims. Just because you have them doesn't mean that you can assert them.

MS. SELDEN: Your Honor, on that point I think that this is exclusively a choice of law decision. The 1st Department decided that New York law rather than Bermuda law should apply to the threshold question of plaintiffs' standing to assert derivative claims. And then it went a little bit further than Your Honor did on the motion to dismiss to say, that with respect to certain of the substantive claims, New York law would also apply. But I don't think that on those substantive claims for illegal dividend, for example, that it reached the conclusion that plaintiffs have adequately pled a cause of action or have stated a claim for illegal dividend.

THE COURT: That's why I'm using the word "may" have a claim. I didn't say that you do have a claim, I'm saying that you may have a claim. Because you still have, if we get over the standing issue, I still have to be convinced that you properly pleaded all of the allegations that would support that claim for illegal dividend, for breach of fiduciary duty for all the seven causes of action.

I read the 1st Department case and sometimes I have a hard time reading cases, but it was pretty clear I didn't say that you got a claim. It's just there were a lot of mays in there, you know. So at the end of the day they didn't give them a pass saying you can just get past -- let's put it this way, if they had said what they had said or what the plaintiff is arguing they said, this would be a summary judgment motion instead of a motion to dismiss. Why bother wasting our time here, right? So that's where I'm going.

Now turning to the standing issue. So I don't believe -- my finding is that the 1st Department did not decide that the plaintiff in this case had standing under New York BCL 626 (c). That issue clearly was not decided by me in the first go around. I didn't address it. And they made a point to remind me that I didn't address it. So that now it's my turn to take another crack at it in terms of whether or not 626 (c) has been satisfied. So that 626 (c) is very clear, it says you have to make a demand or you have to -- what's the exact wording for it? I don't have it. I don't have it.

MR. SINGLER: I have it here if you like.

THE COURT: Thank you. 626 (c) says, "In any such action the complaint shall set forth with particularity the efforts of plaintiff to secure the initiation of such

action by the board or the reason for not making such effort." It's a demand or demand futility.

So I look at the allegations in this complaint here with respect to the derivative nature of this lawsuit. First of all, you're pleading in the alternative. In the first instance you say demand futility. And then that the second instance several paragraphs later you say that I did make a demand. Unlike causes of action where you can plead in the alternative, I think when it comes to derivative action you have to take one or the other, you can't pick and choose, it's this way or this way and either case it's satisfied. That's not how I read pleadings as being liberally construed, you have to pick a position. You either made a demand or you didn't make a demand.

In this case here the record is clear you did make a demand. There is no question about it, it's sprinkled throughout your briefs and throughout this record that a demand was made back in May of 2012. Several demands were made. And, in fact, you even pleaded in your complaint that in April and May of 2012 several demands were made, right? So a demand was made.

MR. SINGLER: I agree. I think that an adequate demand was made. I think what we're saying is that even if for some reason, which we don't believe it is,

defendants assert that it was inadequate or whatever, we're saying it wouldn't matter because even if it was inadequate they had notice and it would have been futile.

THE COURT: I look at your demands. And your demands to me, the way I look at it now, are sufficient, all right, to put the corporation -- it satisfied in my mind the prerequisites that you need to make for a demand.

My next question to you is, on May 31, 2012 the corporation sent you a rejection of your demand. And they clearly said right here, "Based on our analysis and report to the limited board as well as their own review and evaluation, both the limited board as a whole and each of the affiliated directors have determined that it is not in the best interest of Limited to do further investigation or to take any corporate action in response to the matters raised in your letter."

Then they go on to specifics why they addressed or they address specifically why they thought that all the points that were made in the several demand letters were unavailing to them. So you have a rejection of the demand, right?

MR. SINGLER: We do, Your Honor. But I think it's also important to note the date.

THE COURT: It's May 31, 2012.

MR. SINGLER: And the complaint was filed

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THE COURT: No. My response to you now in response to that is, this is the fourth attempt of this This is filed -- let me make sure that I've complaint. got it. October 31, 2014. So that's way after this rejection letter. So that my question to you is, why didn't you plead -- because I read your pleadings with respect to the derivative action, paragraphs 130 through 149. First of all, you couldn't make up your mind whether or not it was demand futility or demand, that's number Number two, you make no mention here of the refusal or the rejection of your demand, unless I missed it or misread it. Because the way I looked at it, my road map to this case is set forth in by Justice Bransten's decision which is a very, very, good decision. Kenney versus Immelt. And that's at 41 Misc.3d 1225 A. And that was on November 7, 2013, a year before you filed this complaint, a year before you filed the third amended complaint here.

She lays out the road map in terms of what happens when you make a demand and there is a rejection.

And she took the position and her finding was that you need to plead everything with specificity. Because there was a whole argument about whether or not how specific you need to do this. Whether or not this has to be done, that

has to be done. If you read it it was it's an excellent decision. It's a road map for every plaintiff to take in terms of how to do a shareholder derivative lawsuit.

Because that's your -- in all the cases that I've read with the shareholder derivative lawsuits -- have a seat, you don't have to stand for this. I'm lecturing you. The Achilles' heel for all the plaintiffs, it's the standing issue, okay? This case now explains under New York law 626 (c) what you've got to do.

So as of November 7, 2013 this decision was out there. So why didn't you look at this decision to now file this October 31, 2014 third amended derivative complaint? It doesn't do any of that. Tell me what happened.

MR. SINGLER: Your Honor, I wasn't going to belabor the point earlier, but I think in Kenney versus

Immelt the Court, what you're referring to earlier which you had to pick or choose futility or demand, and I believe that's the Delaware standard in Lerner that this case specifically rejected.

THE COURT: Kenney -- well, no, Kenney -- what

Kenney rejected was if you made a demand Justice Bransten

said, under Delaware law if you make a demand you have now

relinquished your argument that you don't have a

disinterested board. And she rejected that. She said,

You know what? I don't accept that. That if you make a demand that you waived or you've given up your right to argue that you have an interested board.

So that is what she rejected in terms of looking at Delaware law. But in terms of requiring 626 (c), she crafted or she explained why you need to plead not only with specifics on the demand issue, but when there is a rejection you have to plead specifics with respect to why it's a wrongful refusal. And if you don't do that, that's your Achilles' heel with respect to standing.

Then she went through the analysis of why -- she first went through the demand and said two of the three demands were fine. They were specific enough to get over the properness of the demand. And then she went through the wrongful refusal, the specifics of the wrongful refusal and she found them to be insufficient. Then as a result of that she dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. That's what she did.

She looked at 626 New York law all around, didn't even look at Delaware law. She only looked at Delaware law when it came to comparing Delaware's position says, when you make a demand you've given up the not interested argument. She goes, no, that's not the case in New York, you still have, even if you make the demand, you still have the argument to say that the board is

interested. That's the distinction. I read this case backwards and forwards five times.

MR. SINGLER: I understand, Your Honor. But I think that the timing issue on this is because the rejection did come in after filing. I don't know if there is any authority that says every time that you amend or every time that there is a change of circumstances you would then have to go back and remand or --

THE COURT: No, no.

MR. SINGLER: Or I have to plead away something that happened after the fact.

THE COURT: No, no. But you missed the point though. Because this is — they're taking the position that you have failed to still plead properly standing, okay? So that you saw that motion — this is the motion to dismiss this third amended complaint. You saw that motion. The first thing that said standing. What should have rang a doorbell is like, okay, you know what? I'm going to serve a fourth amended verified complaint and this is what I'm going to say, that I made a demand and here are the specifics of demand. And then they rejected my demand and here are the specifics of why I believe it's wrongful, that the rejection was wrongful. And here it is, boom, done. Now I have standing. Now let's get to the heart of the case. You didn't do that. And the

timing of it is incredible. I'm glad you said that because the timing, you had all the time, it's on your side.

On top of that, this third amended complaint was served after they took issue with your second amended complaint because you kept in there the 717 or 7 -- I forget what cause of action. The 717, you virtually copied over the complaint, you didn't change anything. After the 1st Department made its ruling you just re-served the complaint with the same causes of action. They're like, wait a minute.

MR. SINGLER: Actually we added a couple of causes of action. But the 717 was, and we voluntarily took it --

THE COURT: That tells me, look, you've got to do the work if you want it. I'm reading this derivative action here, the pleadings from paragraphs 130, just so I have it, to 149. It's wholly deficient, it's totally deficient. I can't tell you anyway -- when you read it, I'll give you the demand, that your demand is proper because I read it. But it doesn't tell -- I can't look at that to the exclusion of what happened because this happened back in May of 2012. You commenced this action sometime around that time. But then after that time you've amended this complaint three times. You still

haven't gotten the standing issue down pat yet. Because you're going to ask me to ignore the rejection. You're going to ask me to say that that didn't even take place. I can't do that. That's not the law.

MR. SINGLER: If Your Honor is then leaning towards, it sounds like you are, dismissing the complaint on that grounds, I would absolutely ask for leave to amend because it's very curable. If you look at the Young Conaway letter it is a 12 page investigation.

THE COURT: Let's not go there in terms of we'll see what happens. But if you were going to do that, well, before I even tell you what I want to do next --

Your response to this?

MS. SELDEN: Your Honor, if there were one case
I would point to on the question of standing it would be
Kenney versus Immelt. I think you're exactly right to
look at that.

THE COURT: You couldn't ask for a better, clearer case in terms of a road map as to how a plaintiff in a derivative lawsuit can get over the standing issue. Whether or not they can do it, that's another story but it lays out what you've got to do.

MS. SELDEN: Exactly. It lays out exactly what you have to do. And the only place where plaintiffs make any attempt to address this letter that they have had

since May 31, 2012, three years ago, is paragraph 136 of their third amended complaint which just says, "Subsequent to filing, Culligan's board did notify, call for individual plaintiffs that it was refusing to act on the demand." That is --

THE COURT: What's that?

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MS. SELDEN: That's not enough to establish standing.

THE COURT: There is a question mark.

Immelt, 626 by Auerbach, all of New York law requires a plaintiff who is seeking to displace the board of directors of a company and bring litigation on its behalf to allege why the demand was wrongful, you have to look specifically at some reason that the board's decision was wrongful and displace their judgment on that call. Here you have the Young Conaway letter. It lays out all of the things that the board had considered when it looked at this hard and decided not to bring this litigation for all kinds of reasons. And for similar reasons to the reasons that the demand was refused.

THE COURT: You heard what he said. Counsel's argument is he wants to, if he believes there is deficiencies here that he should be permitted to serve a fourth amended derivative complaint.

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I have a question to ask you, counsel. Who is paying for this lawsuit on your end, on the defense side?

MS. SELDEN: Your Honor, this lawsuit is paid for in a variety of ways. But as you'll see in the Young Conaway letter, and I think that Your Honor is putting your finger on it, on the bottom of page two, Exhibit F to affidavit, it notes one reason the board did not elect to pursue these claim is that Culligan Limited indemnifies CD&R LLC for these claims, such if claims succeed on behalf of Culligan Limited and CD&R, LLC, CD&R is indemnified for those claims. That's a reason the board often elects not to pursue claims likes these. That's the reason the board didn't pursue them in Auerbach and I believe in Kenney. But that is a fair consideration for a board to take into account.

THE COURT: The bottom line is the money is coming out of the corporation's pocket?

MS. SELDEN: Yes.

THE COURT: Not money from insurance carriers, the insurance carriers are not involved in this. There is no other proceeds coming in separately. That doesn't affect your bottom line.

MS. SELDEN: There is also insurance coverage which covers defense costs. But ultimately as you see in the Young Conaway letter and, frankly, as was disclosed to

these plaintiffs in the offering memorandum when they bought shares in 2006 on page 61 of that offering memorandum, clearly states that Culligan Limited indemnifies CD&R and its directors. So this lawsuit is circular.

MR. SINGLER: That's interesting because when a year or two ago when Culligan went into liquidate, the most they could possibly have is \$474,000, I believe. And so if they have been fighting this lawsuit the entire time -- I don't think that Ms. Selden answered the question. She didn't reference defense coverage because at the end of the day I don't think that they have any money and I think it's the CD&R guys that are ultimately paying, but I'm speculating.

If I may?

THE COURT: What I'm approaching is that I have to tell you, last night when I was reading all this I was not happy about where that is, basically where this is a fourth attempt for serving an amended complaint. Because the way I look at it is, when I went to grammar school if you made a mistake once, the teacher reprimands you. But if the made a mistake twice, the nun would rap your knuckles.

You've had four chances to get this right. And it's not as if you didn't have or at least -- look, if I

can find -- if I can read it you've got to be able to do that. Because I was on that side too for a short period of time. You have to get it right at least at some point.

So when are you going to get it right? So now you're asking me for permission to serve another complaint, another verified, another amended derivative complaint, the fourth one which is your fifth attempt to do it right.

MR. SINGLER: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Let me finish.

MR. SINGLER: All right.

THE COURT: There is a cost attached to this and it's not a free ride, as they say, at some point. And that last night I was thinking, I was inclined to say, you know what? I'm done with this. I'm going to dismiss it with prejudice. But then I thought again, having slept on it, that perhaps that's not the right way to go. So that what I'm thinking --

Before I say what I'm going to say, what's your response.

MR. SINGLER: Well, Your Honor, I think in all due fairness to the plaintiffs and to us --

THE COURT: Fairness? What's fairness? You did it four times, where is the fairness? These guys are in here four times already.

MR. SINGLER: First amended complaint was because circumstances changed from the time we filed and then they closed the deal.

THE COURT: I give you that. Second and third then?

MR. SINGLER: Well, that the second time was after the --

THE COURT: After the appeal.

MR. SINGLER: After the appeal. And we added a couple of causes of action. The third it was a clerical because we were arguing over -- we left 717 in there, so.

THE COURT: My position is, you know, I hear your arguments. I was an associate a long time ago. And I was always worried when things left my desk that it was insufficient. That I made sure that it was to the T, to the letter right on. Somebody on your side has to read this stuff. Because if I could read this stuff at 2:00 in the morning and figure out that something is not right, someone younger than me can read it and say, you know what? We're missing a lot of stuff here, especially derivative.

I hear your argument, I'm not buying it. That is the frustration on my part when you're saying where is the fairness, when it comes to defendants being dragged in here all the time because you serve another complaint.

And they are going to come back in here again.

So that, you know, at some point -- you know what I'm going to do? If you want to serve the fourth amended complaint, the fifth time to take a crack at it, I'm going to hit you with the costs. You're going to have to pay what they had to do to oppose this motion, because they have laid it right out in the front what the problem is. The first problem was standing. And right there that should have set off an incredible alarm bell to say, let's take a look at standing to make sure that we're clean. Any kindergartner can read this and say, we have to clean this up, it doesn't make any sense. Especially with Judge Bransten's decision out there, Judge Oing is going to read that, unless he's a dingbat and he doesn't read that decision. We better make sure because he reads his cases.

So at that point that's what I'm going to do.

You want to take a fifth crack at it, I'll let you take a fifth crack at it but you're going to have to pay them the cost for making this motion which clocks in -- the time that you're going to clock in is the first time that you put pen to paper with respect to this motion to dismiss, to the time right now where we finish oral argument. That's the cost and attorneys fees that you're going to pay the defendant for you to serve a fourth amended complaint, a fifth crack at it. That's my position.

You've got it?

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MR. SINGLER: And if we can put reasonable in there.

THE COURT: Reasonable, sure.

MR. SINGLER: Because you're going to be reviewing it.

THE COURT: Of course I'll review whatever bill they submit to you. If you decide to go that route, I will take a look at. If you believe it's reasonable, you don't have to get me involved. But if you believe it's unreasonable, you bring it to my attention and I'll look it over. But I already told them what the timeline is, first time they put pen to paper to this motion to dismiss to the time that they are here making this oral argument when they clock out and say thank you and leave the That's the timeline we're looking at in terms courtroom. of the cost that you're going to pay, including attorneys fees that you're going to have to pay them if you want to take a fifth crack at this. Because at the end of the day the phrase is enough is enough. You either get it right or you don't get it right. But you're not going to keep coming back and back, you know, no. A lot of jurists wouldn't even have given you that many times. I'm going to give you the fifth time, sure. But you're going to have to pay for that, okay? That's my decision.

Okay, this is my decision and order with respect to the defendants' motion to -- I'm sorry, have a seat, counselor. Any comments before I call it a day?

MS. SELDEN: Your Honor, my additional comments would be this, there are multiple other reasons to dismiss this complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim because all of the decisions that they challenge are precluded by the business judgment rule. Because these plaintiffs are coming in here as the worst kind of Monday morning quarterbacks, objecting to decisions that they knew about and agreed to, that they got \$30 millions from at the time. Enough is enough. And at this point this should be dismissed with prejudice.

THE COURT: I heard what you said and I thought about whether or not to dismiss with respect to the seven causes of actions. I don't necessarily, because I'm not sure if they are going to take an appeal of this which they may, I don't necessarily need to clutter the record. There is only one issue I decide, one single issue. If the appellate review is sought, that's all that the 1st Department has to look at. I learned my lesson. I'm not going to start doing all these multi-things because that clutters the record. So that the only singular issue on appeal right now is, if appellate review is sought, is the standing issue. And my position is with respect to the

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standing issue, the allegations set forth in this third amended complaint is just wholly deficient in terms of demonstrating to me or sufficiently alleging that the demand was made and that the refusal or rejection of that demand was wrongful. That's it. I hear what you're saying but we'll take it another day, all right?

So that's my decision. So my decision and order with respect to the defendants' motion to dismiss is as I'm going to grant the motion to dismiss on the follows: ground that the plaintiffs here have failed to sufficiently allege that they have standing to maintain this derivative lawsuit. In that regard, with respect to that those allegations in paragraph 130 to 149, those allegations, if you read it, they had alternative allegations. On the one sense they were saying that, they were alleging that the demand was futile and on the other sense they were saying that the demand was made. result is clear, the demands, plural, have been made upon on the corporation. The record is also clear a rejection of that demand was also provided. Because of that they needed, under the Kenney decision that I recited, they needed to plead with specificity the demands. And they needed also to plead with specificity the rejection of that demand. In other words, whether or not that rejection was wrongful, those allegations are missing. Ι

looked at the demands here. Ostensibly the demand appears to be getting sufficient in terms of form to have proper demands. They got to now plead it with specificity. They have to take what they said in those demand letters and put it in the complaint. And I'm not here to do it for them. At the end of the day the missing key, missing component in this complaint here is the rejection and whether or not it was wrongful and why it was wrongful. There is nothing in these allegations that tell me that.

So under those circumstances they have failed, plaintiffs have failed to set forth sufficient allegations to demonstrate that they have standing in conformity with the Kenney decision that I cited for the record. Having said that, I'm dismissing this action without prejudice to the plaintiffs to replead for the fifth time in a fourth amended verified complaint. They're going to look it over carefully because if it comes to me again and it's wholly deficient again, then I will dismiss it with prejudice. I'm not going to keep going on with this case.

The second thing is, that if they do decide to plead again and serve a fourth amended complaint, they will have to first pay the costs to the defendants for them to oppose or made a motion to dismiss this amended complaint. The timeline that's to be calculated is from the time that they put pen to paper, the defendants put

pen to paper on the motion to dismiss, to the time today when they leave this courtroom. That's the timeline that I'm looking at in terms of the costs and attorneys fees that are going to be recoverable.

Of course if plaintiffs believe that the bill is unreasonable, they can make an application to the Court for me to look it over. I suspect we'll see where it goes from there when I take a look at that. But that is the condition to serving a fourth amended complaint, which is their fifth time doing it. And I only say that because, I take that hard stand because there is enough in this record here, timeline wise with respect to decisions, judicial decisions to permit, to have permitted plaintiffs to actually sit down and figure out what allegations were necessary to get over the standing issue. I just don't understand why it wasn't done.

That's my decision and order. It's dismissed. It's dismissed without prejudice on the condition if they serve another complaint, that they pay for the attorneys fees, reasonable attorneys fees and costs with respect to the defendants' application to continue and decide the balance of the motions. With respect to the seven causes of action, that branch of the motion is denied without prejudice. My position is that I want a singular issue that is dealt with here so in case the plaintiffs do seek

appellate review, the Appellate Court will have this one issue that they can have in front of them without me cluttering the record, without the other causes of action. That's my decision and order. Anything else?

MR. SINGLER: Other than could we have some timeframes possibly for defendants to provide that and for us to file a complaint all within --

THE COURT: First of all, when do you think that you can serve the fourth amended complaint by? Give yourself enough time to look it over.

MR. SINGLER: I do actually have a family vacation.

THE COURT: I wouldn't mess with that.

MR. SINGLER: If I may, I would say certainly by July 1st.

THE COURT: July 1st. You have until July 1st to serve the fourth amended complaint. If you do not serve and file the fourth amended complaint by July 1st, then this action will be dismissed or is dismissed with prejudice without further order of the Court. You then will, I guess if they're planning to do July 1st -- they are not going to really know, I guess that you can serve them. You can serve them any time between now and July 1st the amount, the reasonable attorneys fees and costs for opposing this or for making this motion, you can

serve it to them.

MR. SINGLER: Could I ask that it be done a little ahead of time? Because you would also have to, if you think it's unreasonable, you would have to take a look at it.

THE COURT: How much time? You just have to press a button. How much time do you need?

MS. SELDEN: Your Honor, I don't think that it would take much time for us to prepare and submit our bill for attorneys fees and costs incurred in total between the moment at which we first put pen to paper on the motion to dismiss and the close of oral argument today, if that includes all attorneys fees and costs on this litigation within that timeframe, we can do that very quickly within the next two weeks.

THE COURT: Okay, two weeks. Today is -- all the costs and attorneys fees that are related to this motion from the time period I discussed, okay? Not everything else that preceded that.

MS. SELDEN: Right, Your Honor. And I guess one question then to clarify is, you know, while this litigation was pending we have also during the pendency of this motion obviously incurred the costs in connection with the motion that was before Your Honor last week for approval of the settlement and our --

THE COURT: Take that out, that's the carve out.

MS. SELDEN: That may take a little bit of extra

time.

THE COURT: I'm only interested in this motion to dismiss which you made, which you clearly put in your motions why you thought it should be dismissed. So that for them to keep going is something that I'm not happy with. So that's what I'm looking at at this point.

Yes, counsel?

MR. SINGLER: And a fair portion of this motion is repetitive of the earlier motion as well.

THE COURT: No, it doesn't matter. It's from the time that you put pen to paper when this started, this motion, even if they cut and paste, it doesn't matter. You guys — you guys were the driving force. You could have seen the motion and said, you know what? We see where we have a problem here. We'll take care of it so we don't have to go down the next few yards. But you didn't do that. So today is May 21st — today is May 28th. And that puts it over a week. June 12 serve the plaintiffs' counsel with your bill. And if you believe it's not reasonable — send it with a copy to the Court and then I will wait to hear from plaintiffs' counsel. And if need be, I will call everybody in to have a quick conference on that.

Okay, so that's my decision and order. Counsel, you're the moving party. Please order the transcript and I'll so order it for your records. And include the cost of this transcript in the bill. Thank you. Have a good afternoon.

MS. SELDEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT.

JACK L. MORELLI, CM, CSR

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JEFFREY K. OING