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Peter A. Mahler

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Peter A. Mahler is a litigator focusing on business divorce cases involving dissolution and other disputes among co-­owners of closely held business entities, such as limited liability companies, corporations, and partnerships. Peter represents both control and non-control owners, often involving family-owned businesses. Frequently counseling business owners prior to litigation, he advises them of their rights and also assists in designing and negotiating an amicable separation between parties. Peter’s counsel helps avoid litigation by means of a buy-out, sale, or division of business assets.

 

 

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New York’s statutes governing buyouts in dissolution and dissenting shareholder cases use the term “fair value” (FV) as the standard used to determine purchase price. The statutes do not define FV.

In contrast, “fair market value” (FMV) is a widely recognized standard of value used in the business world, in tax assessment proceedings and elsewhere. The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms defines FMV as “the price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arms length in an open and unrestricted market, when neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.”

Are FV and FMV the same?

Not by a long shot. As succinctly stated in one of the more prominent valuation treatises, “the term fair value is usually a legally created standard of value that applies to certain specific transactions”. S. Pratt, R. Reilly & R. Schweihs, Valuing a Business, p. 32 (4th ed. 2000). My even more succinct translation: FV means whatever the courts say it means.

In New York case law, the main difference between FMV and FV concerns application of a minority discount in valuing the shares of a dissolution petitioner or dissenting shareholder. A minority discount, also referred to as a discount for lack of control (“DLOC”), reflects the lower price a hypothetical buyer would pay for shares in a corporation that do not give their owner control of the board of directors, company management, distributions, changes to the articles of incorporation, etc.   For over 20 years New York courts consistently have ruled that, unlike in proceedings applying the FMV standard of value, the FV standard excludes DLOC. In many other states that also use the FV standard in statutory buyout proceedings, unlike New York, the courts also exclude the discount for lack of marketability (“DLOM”) applicable to non-publicly listed shares that cannot be sold quickly and at low cost. Bottom line: in New York statutory valuation proceedings applying the FV standard, the selling shareholder gets a significantly higher price compared to the FMV standard.

For those who want to learn more on the subject, I recommend reading a recent appellate decision out of Arkansas in which the court explains the difference between FMV and FV in the context of a dispute over the valuation of the interests of withdrawing partners in a family limited partnership.Continue Reading Fair Value vs. Fair Market Value

In the judicial dissolution arena, one of the trickiest decisions faced by counsel representing a 50% shareholder of a closely held New York corporation is whether to ask for dissolution based on deadlock under Section 1104 of the Business Corporation Law (BCL), or based on allegations that the other 50% shareholder is guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive conduct or has looted, wasted or diverted corporate assets under BCL Section 1104-a, or under both statutes.

The choice can have a dramatic effect on the outcome of the proceedings, not just because of the different proofs required, but because only one of the statutes – BCL Section 1104-a – triggers the other shareholder’s right to avoid dissolution by electing to purchase for “fair value” the shares of the petitioning shareholder.  (See previous post on the subject.)

In many business divorce cases involving two 50% shareholders there nonetheless is one natural buyer and one natural seller. Sometimes it’s because one of the two controls more of the client relationships. Sometimes it’s because one of the two personally or through a separate company owns the realty leased by the co-owned company. Sometimes it’s because one of the two has far deeper pockets. In these situations, the 50% shareholder who wants out and his or her counsel must think long and hard about whether they gain or lose bargaining leverage by handing the opposing shareholder the right to force a buyout. In my experience, a deadlock petition under BCL Section 1104 usually packs a bigger wallop than an 1104-a petition by denying the automatic buyout and thereby putting added pressure on the shareholder who may be more motivated to keep the company as a going concern. Continue Reading Dissolution and the 50% Shareholder

Dissolution of a closely held New York corporation can be accomplished either voluntarily, by vote of the shareholders, or involuntarily by way of a petition for judicial dissolution. The two methods are fundamentally different and should never be confused.

Article 10 of the Business Corporation Law (BCL) governs voluntary or “non-judicial” dissolution.  For corporations formed after…