Under the right set of facts, New York courts occasionally find remedies for LLC owners not explicitly authorized in the Limited Liability Company Law (“LLC Law”). Judges have a natural inclination to try to find solutions for legal problems where existing law falls short, which is part of how the common law came to be.

One striking example is the LLC derivative cause of action. In Tzolis v Wolff, 10 NY3d 100 [2008], the Court of Appeals ruled that members of an LLC “may bring derivative suits on the LLC’s behalf, even though there are no provisions governing such suits in the Limited Liability Company Law,” and even though the Legislature considered, but rejected, including a derivative right of action in the LLC Law.

Another remedy not found in the LLC statutes is the so-called “equitable buyout” in LLC dissolution proceedings.

In a nutshell, an equitable buyout grants an LLC member the possibility upon dissolution of the company (under circumstances yet to be well defined by the courts) of the ability to purchase the other member’s interest as an alternative to liquidation and sale of the company’s assets at auction. An equitable buyout results in one member involuntarily selling his or her equity to the other, and the other member becoming the business’s sole owner. The entity’s existence continues post-buyout – despite ostensibly being “dissolved.” Continue Reading The LLC Equitable Buyout: Past, Present, Future

The steady flow and scholarly character of Delaware Chancery Court opinions in company valuation contests provide an important resource and learning tool for business divorce practitioners, appraisers, and judges in New York and elsewhere.

Over the years, I’ve reported on a number of Chancery Court decisions in statutory fair value cases arising from dissenting shareholder proceedings. In this post, I highlight two recent post-trial opinions by Vice Chancellors Sam Glasscock (photo left) and Tamika Montgomery-Reeves (photo right) addressing valuation and what I’ll call quasi-valuation in more atypical settings.

In the first case, Vice Chancellor Glasscock applied a fair value standard to resolve a buy-out settlement agreement between ex-spouses who co-owned two operating companies and a real estate holding company. In the second case, Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves determined whether a biotechnology start-up company was insolvent for purposes of appointing a receiver under Section 291 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Continue Reading Delaware Chancery Court Rulings Address Valuation and Insolvency Disputes

The sudden death of Alexander Calderwood, the brilliant but troubled co-founder of the Ace brand of hotels, resulted in some fierce litigation between Calderwood’s estate and Calderwood’s LLC co-member over the nature of his estate’s membership interest in the company after his death. The litigation came to a head earlier this month, when Justice Barbara R. Kapnick issued a scholarly decision for a unanimous panel of the Appellate Division, First Department in Estate of Calderwood v ACE Group Int’l, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08750 [1st Dept Dec. 14, 2017].

Boiled down, the question on appeal was whether, under Delaware law, Calderwood’s estate was a bona fide member of the LLC with all of a member’s associated rights and privileges, or instead, a mere assignee of Calderwood’s membership interest. As written about in a post last Spring (read here), New York County Commercial Division Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich issued a decision dismissing most of the Estate’s amended complaint, holding that the Estate lacked membership status in the LLC upon Calderwood’s death. Let’s see how the appeals court considered the issue. Continue Reading Delaware Contractarian Principles Prevail in Appeal Over Deceased Ace Hotel Founder’s LLC Interest

The East River and roughly five miles as the pigeon flies separate the equally beautiful courthouses of the Appellate Division, Second Department in Brooklyn and the Appellate Division, First Department in Manhattan. Because of the limited jurisdiction and very selective docket of New York’s highest court known as the Court of Appeals, in the vast majority of cases these two intermediate appellate courts effectively are the courts of last resort for their respective geographic slices of downstate New York.

Over many years, a different sort of divide has separated the two appellate courts when it comes to statutory fair value proceedings and, in particular, their treatment of the controversial discount for lack of marketability (DLOM).

The earliest version of the DLOM divide concerned whether it should apply to good-will value only, that is, not to the value of realty, cash, and other net tangible assets. For over two decades, prevailing Second Department case law limited application of DLOM in that fashion; the First Department did not. The decisions of one court didn’t acknowledge the other’s. Then, in 2010, without discussion or even acknowledging a change, the Second Department in the Murphy case seemingly healed the rift by dropping the good will limitation.

I say seemingly because, in recent years, the DLOM divide between the two appellate courts quietly has resurfaced in the context of fair value contests involving real estate holding companies where, on the Manhattan side of the river, First Department cases have accepted the appropriateness of a marketability discount on account of the realty’s “corporate wrapper.” Meanwhile, on the Brooklyn side of the river, Second Department cases have rejected DLOM on the theory that the value of a realty holding entity is the value of the realty or, alternatively, that a marketability discount already is incorporated in the underlying realty appraisal by way of an assumed market-exposure period. Continue Reading A River’s Divide: Time for the Manhattan and Brooklyn Appellate Courts to Agree on Marketability Discount in Fair Value Proceedings

When the tsunami of LLC enabling statutes swept the U.S. in the late ’80s and early ’90s, including New York in 1994, many included a default rule authorizing as-of-right member withdrawal and payment for the “fair value” of the membership interest. The default rule was one of many designed to avoid C corporation-style “double taxation” of LLC earnings. After 1997, when the IRS adopted check-the-box regulations cementing pass-through partnership tax treatment for LLCs, New York and other states flipped the default rule, i.e., members are no longer permitted to withdraw unless authorized by the operating agreement.

When New York amended its withdrawal provision, LLC Law § 606, it included a new subsection “b” grandfathering LLCs formed before the amendment’s 1999 effective date, meaning that withdrawal under the “old” § 606 and fair-value buyout under LLC Law § 509’s default rule remain available for members of pre-1999 LLCs — so long as not otherwise provided in the operating agreement. The Chiu case, which I wrote about here, is an example of one such case resulting in a fair-value buyout of a withdrawn member.

After the amendments, some pre-1999 New York LLCs adopted new operating agreements or amended their existing ones to prohibit withdrawal. Some, as in Chiu, did not.

This is a story about one LLC that did not, but with a very different outcome than Chiu. The story’s punch line, which makes it a fascinating one, is that even though the minority member, seeking to force a fair-value buyout, was found to have properly invoked his uncontested right to withdraw under the old § 606, in the end the lower and appellate courts held that his withdrawal did not trigger a statutory buyout under § 509 because the LLC’s operating agreement included mandatory rights of first refusal — with which the minority member never complied — that displaced the buyout statute’s default rule.

The case, Matter of Jacobs v Cartalemi, was decided last week by the Appellate Division, Second Department, along with two decisions in companion appeals in related cases in which the court held that upon withdrawal the minority member also lost his standing to pursue derivative claims against the controlling member. I’ll explain all below, but before doing so I must disclose that, along with co-counsel, my firm and I represent the controlling member of the LLC in each of the cases. Continue Reading Operating Agreement Defeats Statutory Buyout Rights Upon LLC Member’s Withdrawal

If you haven’t yet listened to prior episodes of the Business Divorce Roundtable (a) it’s time you did and (b) absolutely you won’t want to miss the latest episode (click on the link at the bottom of this post) featuring first-hand, real-life, business divorce stories told by business appraiser Tony Cotrupe of Melioria Advisors (photo left) and attorney Jeffrey Eilender of Schlam Stone & Dolan (photo right).

Tony’s and Jeff’s stories have a common element: both involve the contentious break-up of a poisonous business relationship between two brothers. The similarity ends there. In my interview of Tony, he puts us inside a fast-paced and ultimately successful effort by the feuding second-generation owners of a propane distributorship, guided by their respective lawyers working in collaboration, to avoid litigation by engineering a buy-out of one brother by the other based on Tony’s business appraisal as the jointly retained, independent evaluator. It’s a happy ending to what otherwIse could have turned into a drawn-out courtroom slugfest.

Courtroom slugfest aptly sums up Jeff’s story as counsel for the brother owning the minority interest in Kassab v. Kasab, a case I’ve featured on this blog several times including last month’s post-trial decision giving the other brother the opportunity to buy out the minority interest upon pain of dissolution if he doesn’t (read here, here, and here). Jeff’s insider analysis of the case provides unique insights into a multi-faceted, roller-coaster-ride of a case involving novel issues under the statutes and case law governing business corporations and limited liability companies.

If you’re a lawyer, business appraiser or business owner with a business divorce story you’d like to share for a future podcast, drop me a line at pmahler@farrellfritz.com.

 

Regular readers of this blog know it’s been anything but summer doldrums in the world of business divorce, what with case law developments such as the Appellate Division’s potentially far-reaching ruling on the purposeless purpose clause and LLC dissolution in Mace v Tunick reported in last week’s post, and the astonishing story of minority shareholder oppression in the Twin Bay Village case also reported earlier this month.

This year’s edition of Summer Shorts picks up the summer pace with short summaries of three must-read decisions by New York and Delaware courts on three very different business divorce topics: use of a Special Litigation Committee to evaluate derivative claims brought by LLC members (New York); grounds for dissolution and the court’s remedial powers in shareholder oppression cases (New York); and LLC deadlock dissolution (Delaware).

Appellate Ruling Rejects Appointment of Special Litigation Committee in LLC Derivative Suit Where Not Authorized By Operating Agreement

LNYC Loft, LLC v Hudson Opportunity Fund I, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 06147 [1st Dept Aug. 15, 2017].  In Tzolis v Wolff, New York’s highest court recognized a common-law right of LLC members to sue derivatively on behalf of the LLC. Subsequent lower court decisions have clarified other aspects of the right by analogy to corporation law, such as requiring the plaintiff LLC member to allege pre-suit demand or demand futility. In shareholder derivative suits involving corporations, the board’s inherent authority to appoint a Special Litigation Committee composed of independent and disinterested directors to assess derivative claims is well established and, when properly implemented, can result in the court’s dismissal of derivative claims based on the SLC’s conclusion that the claims do not merit prosecution by the corporation. Continue Reading Summer Shorts: Three Must-Read Decisions

Over the years I’ve litigated and observed countless cases of alleged oppression of minority shareholders by the majority. Oppression can take endlessly different forms, some more crude than others in their execution, some more draconian than others in their effect.

If there was an award for the crudest and most draconian case of shareholder oppression, Matter of Twin Bay Village, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06024 [3d Dept Aug. 3, 2017], decided earlier this month by an upstate appellate panel, would be a serious contender.

The case involves a bitter dispute between two branches of the Chomiak family over a lakefront resort called Twin Bay Village located on beautiful Lake George in upstate New York. In 1957, the husband-and-wife founders, Stephan and Eleonora Chomiak, opened the summer resort on land they owned. They and their two sons, Leo and Vladimir, together ran the business until 1970 when they transferred ownership of the land and business to newly-formed Twin Bay Village, Inc. owned 26% by each parent and 24% by each son. Continue Reading And the Award For Most Oppressive Conduct By a Majority Shareholder Goes to . . .

Gun4HireThe title of this post notwithstanding, the judge’s decision in the recent, high-stakes stock valuation case I’m about to describe, featuring a clash of business appraiser titans whose conclusions of value differed by almost 400%, did not refer to them as “hired guns.”

But the judge did not mince her words in expressing the view that, while “unquestionably qualified to testify on the issue of valuation,” the two experts, whose “zealous advocacy” for their respective clients “compromised their reliability,” offered “wildly disparate” values that were “tailored to suit the party who is paying for them.” Ouch!

The 54-page decision by a Minnesota state court judge in Lund v Lund, Decision, Order & Judgment, No. 27-CV-14-20058 [Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin Cnty. June 2, 2017], rejected both experts’ values — $80 million according to the expert for the selling shareholder and $21 million according to the expert for the purchasing company — in arriving at the court’s own value of $45 million for a 25% interest in a chain of 26 upscale grocery stores in the Twin Cities area known as Lunds & Byerlys together with affiliated management and real estate holding companies. Continue Reading Appraisers’ Valuations Are Light-Years Apart, But Does That Make Them Hired Guns?

Buy-SellAt least on paper, shotgun provisions in shareholder and operating agreements provide an elegant and efficient buy-out solution when business owners can’t get along and need a divorce. In a two-owner company, the one who “pulls the trigger” names a price at which he or she either will buy the other’s interest or sell to the other. The other owner has a specified amount of time to decide which. Since the offeror doesn’t know who will be the buyer, in theory there’s a great incentive to name an objectively fair price. The agreement usually also will prescribe payment terms. No need for appraisal. No fuss. No muss.

I’m not aware of any data-based studies on the subject, but I believe experienced lawyers would concur that shotgun clauses, although frequently included in owner agreements, are rarely invoked. Why is that? I can only speculate that owners generally prefer other ways to achieve a breakup without the uncertainty of knowing who will end up with the business. Also, owners are reluctant to be the trigger-puller, that is, there’s a natural preference to be the one with the option to buy or sell at a price named by the other.

Shotguns also can suffer from informational and financial asymmetries between the owners, a problem highlighted in my two-part, online interview of Professors Landeo and Spier some years ago (here and here). As Professor Spier described it: Continue Reading Aim Carefully Before Pulling Trigger on Shotgun Buy-Sell Agreement