Derivative Actions

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Board members’ decisions to award compensation packages for themselves can present some thorny issues. In a close corporation, shareholders typically serve as officers and directors, and have a reasonable expectation of compensation in lieu of dividends or distributions. But dissenting shareholders or directors, armed with the benefit of hindsight, can, and often do, criticize a board’s compensation decisions as excessive, claiming self-dealing, looting, and waste. What statutory protections do board members have when making compensation decisions? To what extent can board members truly rely on those protections?

In Cement Masons Local 780 Pension Fund v Schleifer, 56 Misc 3d 1204 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50875 [U] [Sup Ct NY County June 29, 2017], Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Saliann Scarpulla considered these issues in a thoughtful opinion, in which she relied on some relatively infrequently litigated provisions of the Business Corporation Law (“BCL”). The decision is also noteworthy for its reliance on decisional law from Delaware on not one, but two important issues of law, one of which was an apparent question of first impression in New York. Although Cement Masons Local involved a public company, it addressed the same statutes that govern close corporations, and provides helpful guidance to board members, and counsel, when weighing compensation decisions. Continue Reading Navigating Rocky Shoals and Safe Harbors When Board Members Fix Their Own Compensation

A business’s failure to pay state taxes can be a problem if the entity later wants to bring a lawsuit, or its non-controlling owners want to sue on the entity’s behalf.

Under Section 203-a of the New York Tax Law, a New York business entity’s failure to pay franchise taxes for two years can result in automatic dissolution of the entity by proclamation of the New York State Secretary of State. Once a corporation is dissolved by proclamation for failure to pay franchise tax, it “does not enjoy the right to bring suit in the court of this state, except in [very] limited respects specifically permitted by statute.” Moran Enterprises, Inc. v Hurst, 66 AD3d 972 [2d Dept 2009].

What happens when an out-of-state entity, or shareholders on the entity’s behalf, attempt to sue in a New York court, despite the business not having paid taxes for several years in its home state? New York County Commercial Division Justice Anil C. Singh recently considering that question, specifically with respect to a Delaware entity, in Juma Technology Corp. v Servidio, Decision and Order, Index No. 151483/2016 [Sup Ct, NY County May 24, 2017]. Continue Reading Minority Shareholders’ Derivative Suit Foiled by Voiding of Corporation’s Charter for Nonpayment of Taxes

Therapy1At first glance, you might think the plaintiff minority shareholder in Sardis v Sardis, 2017 NY Slip Op 27163 [Sup Ct Suffolk County May 11, 2017], achieved her derivative lawsuit’s goal when the defendant controlling shareholder, about a month after suit was filed, suddenly reversed course by revoking the corporation’s allegedly wrongful voluntary dissolution that seemingly was the lawsuit’s raison d’être.

You might also think, having apparently forced defendant’s capitulation, the minority shareholder would be entitled to recover her legal fees in the action as authorized by Section 626 (e) of the Business Corporation Law whenever a shareholder derivative action “was successful, in whole or in part, or if anything was received by the plaintiff . . . as a result of the judgment, compromise, or settlement of an action or claim.”

But, as often is the case in shareholder lawsuits, first impressions can be deceptive.

The Sardis case, in which Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson denied the plaintiff’s fee application seeking $650,000, is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, the facts and circumstances leading up to the decision — starting with the settlement of a complex matrimonial divorce in which the ex-spouses continued to co-own interests in a valuable operating company, followed by legal proceedings in Delaware, followed by legal proceedings in New York — tell a fascinating story of a high-stakes, three-dimensional legal chess game.

Second, and more importantly for practitioners, Justice Emerson’s opinion is one of the very few New York state court decisions that takes a probing look at the prevailing “substantial benefit” standard for an award of legal fees under Section 626 (e). Continue Reading Finding No “Therapeutic” Benefit to Corporation, Court Denies Fee Award in Discontinued Shareholder Derivative Action

Food-Fight1A little over three years ago I reported on the first round of a fascinating “food fight” among four siblings, each of whom is a 25% shareholder of a Brooklyn-based, second-generation food distributor known as Jersey Lynne Farms, Inc. (the “Corporation”), and each of whom also is a 25% member of Catarina Realty, LLC (the “LLC”) which leases its sole realty asset to the Corporation.

The occasion back then was the court’s decision in Borriello v Loconte denying a dismissal motion in a derivative suit brought by Dorine Borriello on the LLC’s behalf in which she alleged that her three siblings breached fiduciary duty by leasing its realty to the Corporation at a drastically below-market rent and by imposing on the LLC certain expenses that ought to be borne by the Corporation as tenant.

In 2011 — the same year her siblings entered into the challenged lease — they ousted Dorine as a director, officer, and employee of the Corporation. In 2012 Dorine and her siblings negotiated a Separation Agreement and General Release setting forth terms for payment of compensation and benefits along with non-compete and non-disclosure provisions. The agreement left intact Dorine’s 25% stock interest in the Corporation.

Dorine’s derivative suit filed in 2013 claimed that the 2011 below-market lease rendered the LLC unprofitable while increasing the Corporation’s income used to pay salaries and other benefits to her siblings. The first round went to Dorine when the court ruled that her General Release did not encompass her derivative claim and enjoined her siblings from advancing their legal expenses from LLC funds.

In the end, however, and subject to any appeals Dorine may bring, it appears that the siblings have won the food fight’s final rounds. Continue Reading “Food Fight” Sequel Ends Badly for Ousted Sibling

litigiousThe U.S. reportedly has the world’s highest number of lawyers per capita (1 for every 300 people) and the 5th highest number of lawsuits per capita (74.5 for every 1,000 people, topped only by Germany, Sweden, Israel, and Austria).

If, as it appears, litigation has become a national pastime in the U.S., then why, when we describe someone as having a “litigious nature,” does that label carry such opprobrium? Is there an unspoken assumption that anyone who brings a multitude of lawsuits must not have meritorious claims, or has ulterior motives to sue? Then again, we recently awarded the presidency to someone who, according to a USA Today analysis, has sued or been sued in 3,500 cases over the last 3 decades.

These observations are spurred by a recent court decision in Pokoik v Norsel Realties, 2017 NY Slip Op 50459(U) [Sup Ct NY County Apr. 12, 2017], in which Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Jeffrey K. Oing cited the plaintiff’s “litigious nature” among the factors supporting dismissal of his derivative lawsuit brought against the fellow members of a real estate partnership, some of whom are relatives of the plaintiff, Leon Pokoik. Granted, it was not cited as the primary factor, but it’s one of those atmospheric factors in a litigation whose impact is hard to measure. Continue Reading Suing on Behalf of People You’re Suing Can Sink a Derivative Lawsuit — Especially If You Have a Litigious Nature

HeartWhen a romantic affair evolves into a business relationship, the eventual falling out can be especially messy. Even more so if the former lovers try to keep the business going after the romance ends. That is a theme from a recent post-trial decision by Queens County Justice Timothy J. Dufficy in Shih v Kim, 2017 NY Slip Op 50281(U) [Sup Ct Queens County Mar. 2, 2017].

Among other interesting issues in Shih was whether a capital investment in a business can be considerd a “gift made in contemplation of marriage” under Section 80-b of the New York Civil Rights Law, a statute which requires return of an engagement or wedding gift — often a ring — to the giver if the marriage does not occur. Let’s see how Judge Dufficy ruled on that and the other legal issues in the case. Continue Reading When Love and Business Fails

limited partnershipNotwithstanding the ascendency of the limited liability company, the Delaware limited partnership continues to serve as an important, tax-advantaged vehicle for certain capital-intensive ventures — especially in the energy sector — featuring centralized management and limited liability for large numbers of passive investors.

Late last month, the Delaware Supreme Court handed down two noteworthy decisions springing from suits by limited partners challenging the fairness of conflicted transactions by general partners that were approved by conflicts committees. In one, the high court affirmed Chancery Court’s order rejecting a claim based on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing where the transaction’s approval by the conflicts committee complied with the agreement’s safe harbor provision and thus contractually precluded judicial review. Employees Retirement System v TC Pipelines GP, Inc., No. 291, 2016 [Del. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016].

In the other, Supreme Court reversed Chancery Court’s post-trial decision holding the general partner liable in damages owed directly to limited partners for a conflicted, over-priced  “dropdown” transaction by the general partner. The high court disagreed with Chancery Court’s application of the Tooley standard, instead finding that the claims were exclusively derivative and that the post-trial, pre-judgment acquisition by merger of the partnership extinguished the plaintiff limited partner’s standing to seek relief. El Paso Pipeline GP Company, LLC v Brinckerhoff, No. 103, 2016 [Del. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2016].

Together, the two decisions re-affirm the primacy of contract in the realm of alternative entities including limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and master limited partnerships. Continue Reading Limited Partners Take a Licking in Two Delaware Supreme Court Decisions

door“Marriage is tough, business relationships may be tougher.”

Wise words from someone who should know — Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Timothy S. Driscoll, who presided over matrimonial cases before joining the Commercial Division where he has adjudicated some of the thorniest business divorce cases such as the AriZona Iced Tea donnybrook.

The quoted words appear in an oral argument transcript in a case called Cardino v Feldman pending before Justice Driscoll involving a fight between 50-50 owners of a construction company operated by the defendant Feldman. It’s a factually and procedurally complex matter, the details of which I’ll spare readers in favor of focusing on the main takeaway from Justice Driscoll’s recent decision in the case, namely, that once a business owner asserts a claim for judicial dissolution under Section 1104-a of the Business Corporation Law — even if not pleaded in strict accordance with the statute — it’s very difficult to reverse course after the other shareholder timely elects to purchase the petitioner’s shares for fair value under BCL Section 1118. Continue Reading Once Opened, The Door to Judicial Dissolution and Buy-Out Is Hard to Close

SurchargeHidden in plain view in Section 1104-a (d) of the New York Business Corporation Law, which authorizes an oppressed minority shareholder to petition for judicial dissolution, is a provision empowering the court to adjust stock valuations and to “surcharge” those in control of the corporation for “willful or reckless dissipation or transfer” of corporate assets “without just or adequate compensation therefor.”

A second, fleeting reference to surcharge appears in Section 1118 (b) of the buy-out statute, empowering the court in its determination of the stock’s fair value to give effect to any surcharge “found to be appropriate” under Section 1104-a.

The ordinary definition of surcharge, at least in the context of settling accounts, is to show an omission for which credit ought to have been given. But what does it mean in its statutory setting, and how has it been applied by the courts? Continue Reading The Elusive Surcharge in Dissolution Proceedings

Pay UpIn 2005, Luciano Bonanni sued his business partners in a profitable limited liability company that provides MRI scanners to hospitals and management services to an affiliated radiology practice. The thrust of Bonanni’s multiple-count complaint was that the majority members had squeezed him out of the business, discontinued his profit share, and canceled his 20% membership interest.

In one of the earliest rulings in the case, which I featured in the very first post I published on this blog in 2007, the presiding judge, Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth Hazlitt Emerson, dismissed Bonanni’s claim for judicial dissolution of the LLC. Justice Emerson’s decision, which pre-figured by several years the Second Department’s landmark opinion in 1545 Ocean Avenue, held that Bonanni’s reliance on the grounds for dissolution available to oppressed minority shareholders under Business Corporation Law § 1104-a did not state a valid claim for relief under LLC Law § 702 governing judicial dissolution of LLCs.

As it turned out, the dismissal of the dissolution claim probably was a blessing in disguise for Bonanni. The company continued to generate healthy profits for many years while the litigation dragged on, culminating with a lengthy bench trial on Bonanni’s assorted direct and derivative claims. Earlier this month, Justice Emerson’s post-trial decision in Bonanni v Horizons Investors Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 50281(U) [Sup Ct Suffolk County Mar. 9, 2016], found in Bonanni’s favor on most of his claims, including a determination that the defendants unlawfully converted his 20% membership interest by pretending he had withdrawn from the LLC.

The price tag? When all is said and done, including damages on Bonanni’s direct claims, his share of derivative damages, an upcoming accounting, and hefty interest charges at the 9% statutory rate, the recovery likely will exceed $1 million. Continue Reading A Decade Later, LLC’s Majority Members Pay The Price For Converting Minority Member’s Interest